Главная 
 Новости 
 Аналитика 
 Терроризм 
 ЦАХАЛ 
 Ближний Восток 
 Нам пишут  
 Книги 
 Ссылки 
 О нас 
 Помощь  
Арабо-израильский конфликт : Операция "Nickel Grass"
WarOnline Forums Forum Index
  CalendarCalendar   FAQFAQ  SearchSearch  MemberlistMemberlist   RegisterRegister
 ProfileProfile   Log in to check your private messagesLog in to check your private messages    Перевод латиницы в кириллицуТранслит  Log inLog in
Calendar

Страница памяти Амации
The time now is Fri Dec 19, 2014 6:25 pm
All times are UTC + 2
 Forum index » Военное дело » Арабо-израильский конфликт
Операция "Nickel Grass"
This forum is locked: you cannot post, reply to, or edit topics.   This topic is locked: you cannot edit posts or make replies.    printer-friendly view Page 1 of 2 [40 Posts] View previous topic :: View next topic
Goto page: 1, 2 Next
Author Message
Хамаш
Заслуженный Участник


Joined: 03 Apr 2002
Posts: 119
Location: Хайфа, Израиль

PostPosted: Sat Jun 21, 2003 1:01 am    Post subject:   Операция "Nickel Grass" Reply with quote

Можно ли найти подробную информацию о том какие именно грузы и в каких количествах были поставлены Израилю во время операции? Если возможно, с привязкой к временной шкале войны.
Также было бы интересно услышать мнения форумчан о роли операции в победе Израиля. А то некоторые говорят что она спасла Израиль, а другие - что не играла особой роли.

_________________
Dixi.
Back to top
View user's profile Send private message
Олег Грановский
Главный редактор статей сайта


Joined: 10 Feb 2002
Posts: 24146
Location: Израиль

PostPosted: Sat Jun 21, 2003 1:15 am    Post subject: Reply with quote

Найти вполне можно. Хотя и не очень подробную:

http://www.google.com/custom?hl=en&lr=&ie=ISO-8859-1&cof=L%3Ahttp%3A%2F%2Fwww.fas.org%2Ffas_banner.gif%3BLH%3A50%3BLW%3A600%3BBIMG%3Ahttp%3A%2F%2Fwww.fas.org%2Fpaper2.jpg%3BAH%3Acenter%3B&domains=fas.org&q=Nickel+Grass&btnG=Google+Search&sitesearch=
Back to top
View user's profile Send private message Send e-mail Visit poster's website
Олег Грановский
Главный редактор статей сайта


Joined: 10 Feb 2002
Posts: 24146
Location: Израиль

PostPosted: Sat Jun 21, 2003 1:16 am    Post subject: Reply with quote

Например:

Quote:
Operation Nickel Grass [Yom Kippur War]

On 6 October 1973 Egyptian and Syrian forces launched a surprise attack on Israel. The Egyptian 3rd Army surprised the Israeli Defense Force by attacking across the Suez Canal. Egyptian forces gained a significant foothold in the Sinai and began to drive deeper until a determined defense andcounterattack drove them back.
To achieve the initial surprise, Egyptian forces conducted deception operations of strategic, operational, and tactical significance to exploit Israeli weaknesses. At the strategic level, they conveyed the notions that they would not attack without both a concerted Arab effort and an ability to neutralize the Israeli Air Force, and that tactical preparations were merely in response to feared Israeli retaliation for Arab terrorist activity. At the operational level, Egyptian forces portrayed their mobilization, force buildup, and maneuvers as part of their annual exercises. Egyptian exercises portraying an intent to cross the canal were repeated until the Israelis became conditioned to them and therefore did not react when the actual attack occurred. At the tactical level, Egyptian forces expertly camouflaged their equipment, denying information to Israeli observers and creating a false impression of the purpose of the increased activity.

For their part, Israeli forces were overconfident and indecisive at the operational and strategic levels. In spite of the deception, tactical observers reported with increasing urgency that the Egyptian buildup and activity were significant. Their reports caused concern, but no action. Egyptian forces exploited these vulnerabilities and timed the attack to occur on Yom Kippur, the Jewish Day of Atonement, when they perceived the response of Israeli forces would be reduced.

As a result of their deception efforts, synchronized with other operations of the force, Egyptian forces quickly and decisively overwhelmed Israeli forces in the early stages of the Yom Kippur War.

US Navy forces quickly sortied in response to the war, with two CVBGs (Independence and Roosevelt) and an amphibious force in the Mediteranean and a CVBG (Kennedy) in the Eastern Atlantic. On 25 October U.S. forces went on Defense Condition (DEFCON) III alert status, as possible intervention by the Soviet Union was feared. The Kennedy CVBG and additional amphibious forces entered the Mediterranean.

On 14 October the US Air Force began Operation Nickel Grass, a major airlift to Israel. Ending on 14 November, the airlift transported 22,395 tons of supplies. The airlift was significant because it offset the Soviet airlift to Egypt and Syria, it overcame Israel's critical shortage in certain military items, and it strengthened Israel's overall military position.

On 26 October, CINCSAC and CINCONAD reverted to normal DEFCON status. On 31 October USEUCOM (less the Sixth Fleet) went off DEFCON III status. The Sixth Fleet resumed its normal DEFCON status on 17 November.
Back to top
View user's profile Send private message Send e-mail Visit poster's website
Олег Грановский
Главный редактор статей сайта


Joined: 10 Feb 2002
Posts: 24146
Location: Израиль

PostPosted: Sat Jun 21, 2003 1:24 am    Post subject: Reply with quote

Quote:
One of the most critical but least celebrated airlifts in history unfolded over a desperate 32 days in the fall of 1973. An armada of Military Airlift Command aircraft carried thousands of tons of materiel over vast distances into the midst of the most ferocious fighting the Middle East had ever witnessed-the 1973 Arab­Israeli War. MAC airlifters-T-tailed C-141s and C-5As-went in harm's way, vulnerable to attack from fighters, as they carved a demanding track across the Mediterranean, and to missiles and sabotage, as they were off-loading in Israel.

Though not as famous as the 1948­49 Berlin Airlift or as massive as the 1990­91 Desert Storm airlift, this 1973 operation was a watershed event. Code-named "Nickel Grass," it restored a balance of power and helped Israel survive a coordinated, life-threatening Soviet-backed assault from Egypt and Syria. It proved the Air Force concept of global mobility based on jet-powered transport aircraft. The airlift also transformed the image of the C-5 from that of expensive lemon to symbol of US might.

A quarter of a century ago, in summer and fall 1973, the Mideast seethed with tensions. Six years earlier, in June 1967, Israeli forces conquered vast swaths of land controlled by Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. Cairo and Damascus failed over the years to persuade or force Israel to relinquish its grip on the land and, by 1973, the stalemate had become intolerable. Egypt's Anwar Sadat and Syria's Hafez al-Assad meticulously planned their 1973 offensive, one they hoped would reverse Israeli gains of the earlier war and put an end to Arab humiliation. The war was set to begin on the holiest of Jewish religious days, Yom Kippur.

Trapped by Complacency

The Arab states had trained well and Moscow had supplied equipment on a colossal scale, including 600 advanced surface-to-air missiles, 300 MiG-21 fighters, 1,200 tanks, and hundreds of thousands of tons of consumable war materiel. On paper, the Arabs held a huge advantage in troops, tanks, artillery, and aircraft. This was offset, in Israeli minds, by the Jewish state's superior technology, advanced mobilization capability, and interior lines of communication. Despite unmistakable signs of increasing Arab military capability, Israeli leaders remained unworried, even complacent, confident in Israel's ability to repel any attack.

The Israeli government became unequivocally convinced of impending war just hours before the Arab nations attacked at 2:05 p.m. local time, Oct. 6. Prime Minister Golda Meir, despite her immense popularity, refused to use those precious hours to carry out a pre-emptive attack; she was concerned that the US might withhold critical aid shipments if Washington perceived Israel to be the aggressor.

On the southern front, the onslaught began with a 2,000-cannon barrage across the Suez Canal, the 1967 cease-fire line. Egyptian assault forces swept across the waterway and plunged deep into Israeli-held territory. At the same time, crack Syrian units launched a potent offensive in the Golan Heights. The Arab forces fought with efficiency and cohesion, rolling over or past shocked Israeli defenders. Arab air forces attacked Israeli airfields, radar installations, and missile sites.

Day 4 of the war found Israel's once-confident military suffering from the effects of the bloodiest mauling of its short, remarkably successful existence. Egypt had taken the famous Bar Lev line, a series of about 30 sand, steel, and concrete bunkers strung across the Sinai to slow an attack until Israeli armor could be brought into play. Egyptian commandos ranged behind Israeli lines, causing havoc. In the north, things looked equally bad. The Syrian attack had not been halted until Oct. 10.

Grievously heavy on both sides were the losses in armored vehicles and combat aircraft. Israeli airpower was hard hit by a combination of mobile SA-6 and the man-portable SA-7 air-defense missiles expertly wielded by the Arabs. The attacking forces were also plentifully supplied with radar-controlled ZSU-23-4 anti-aircraft guns. Israeli estimates of consumption of ammunition and fuel were seen to be totally inadequate. However, it was the high casualty rate that stunned Israel, shocking not only Meir but also the legendary Gen. Moshe Dayan, minister of defense.

The shock was accompanied by sheer disbelief at America's failure to comprehend that the situation was critical. Voracious consumption of ammunition and huge losses in tanks and aircraft brought Israel to the brink of defeat, forcing the Israelis to think the formerly unthinkable as they pondered their options.

Half a world away, the United States was in a funk, unable or unwilling to act decisively. Washington was in the throes of not only post-Vietnam moralizing on Capitol Hill but also the agony of Watergate, both of which impaired the leadership of President Richard M. Nixon. Four days into the war, Washington was blindsided again by another political disaster-the forced resignation of Vice President Spiro T. Agnew.

Not surprisingly, the initial US reaction to the invasion was one of confusion and contradiction. Leaders tried to strike a balance of the traditional US support of Israel with the need to maintain a still-tenuous superpower détente with the Soviet Union and a desire to avoid a threatened Arab embargo of oil shipments to the West.

Shifting Scenarios

The many shifts in US military planning to aid Israel are well-documented, notably in Flight to Israel, Kenneth L. Patchin's official MAC history of Operation Nickel Grass. Nixon, in response to a personal plea from Meir, had made the crucial decision Oct. 9 to re-supply Israel. However, four days would pass before the executive office could make a final decision on how the re-supply would be executed.

Initially, planners proposed that Israel be given the responsibility for carrying out the entire airlift. (Israel did use eight of its El Al commercial airliners to carry 5,500 tons of materiel from the US to Israel.) Israel attempted to elicit interest from US commercial carriers, but they refused to enlist in the effort, concerned as they were about the adverse effects Arab reaction would have upon their businesses. MAC's inquiries with commercial carriers received the same negative response. Then, it was suggested that MAC assist the Israeli flag carrier by flying the material to Lajes, the base on the Portuguese Azores islands in the Atlantic, where it could be picked up by Israeli transports.

The US dithered in this fashion for four days. Then, on Oct. 12, Nixon personally decided that MAC would handle the entire airlift. Tel Aviv's Lod/Ben-Gurion air complex would be the off-load point.

"Send everything that can fly," he ordered.

USAF had been preparing right along to take on the challenge. Gen. George S. Brown, USAF Chief of Staff, telephoned Gen. Paul K. Carlton, MAC commander, to begin loading MAC aircraft with materiel but to hold them within the US pending release of a formal order sending them onward. Carlton put his commanders on alert and contacted the heads of other involved commands, including Gen. Jack J. Catton of Air Force Logistics Command. AFLC accorded the same high priority to Nickel Grass, and the results showed immediately. More than 20 sites in the United States were designated to be cargo pick-up points where the US military would assemble materiel for shipment to Israel. Equipment, some directly from war-reserve stocks, began pouring into these sites.

Less than nine hours after Nixon's decision, MAC had C-141s and C-5s ready to depart. There would be some initial delays, and they would encounter some difficulties en route, but they would be the first of a flood of aircraft into Israel.

The complex nature of Nickel Grass required a flexible chain of command. Within MAC, 21st Air Force, commanded by Maj. Gen. Lester T. Kearney Jr., was designated as the controlling Air Force. The vice commander of 21st, Brig. Gen. Kelton M. Farris, was named MAC mission commander. The prime airlift director was Col. Edward J. Nash.

We'll Hold Your Coat

The threat of an oil embargo frightened US allies. With a single exception, they all denied landing and overflight rights to the emergency MAC flights. The exception was Portugal, which, after hard bargaining, essentially agreed to look the other way as traffic mushroomed at Lajes Field. Daily departure flights grew from one to 40 over a few days. This was a crucial agreement for MAC, which could not have conducted the airlift the way it did without staging through Lajes.

When Nixon flashed the decision Oct. 12, top American officials instantly applied pressure for immediate results. MAC's complex machinery sprang into action, but it took some hours to establish a steady, regulated flow of aircraft and crews. Initial flights were delayed because of high winds at Lajes, generating White House fury that supplies had not magically reached Israel.

Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, called Carlton about this, saying, "We'll have to get them moving, or we'll lose our jobs."

Carlton knew the airlift business. He knew that he had an adequate number of aircraft, crews, and required equipment. The fleet consisted of 268 C-141s and 77 C-5As, and Carlton knew that he could sustain a steady flow of three C-141s every two hours and four C-5s every four hours-indefinitely. He also knew that MAC could orchestrate the operation, establishing a rational flow of aircraft matching the cargo to be carried with off-loading equipment at the destination. In his plan, MAC would essentially become a conduit through which materiel would flow in a well-adjusted stream.

At first, however, he could not convey either his concept or his confidence to the White House, State Department, or Pentagon.

Carlton had already begun to expedite things, taking extraordinary actions in the interest of saving time. These steps included waiving crew rest requirements, weight limitations, daily utilization restrictions, and routine maintenance demands. He had to fight a continuing change of orders streaming out of the White House and State and Defense departments. There was continuing pressure to enlist the help of commercial airlines, despite their universal reluctance. At one point, late in the game, officials threatened to remove MAC entirely from the operation.

Even so, Carlton was confident he could establish a flow that not only would let MAC handle the initial requirement of 4,000 tons of materiel but also continue to handle all of MAC's other assignments. He asked for patience, stating that "once this flow starts, it [the materiel] is going to come like a bushel basket of oranges just being dumped."

The average distance from US departure points to Lajes was 3,297 miles. It was another 3,163 miles from Lajes to Lod/Ben-Gurion. The route varied from eastern departure points (McGuire AFB, N.J.; Dover AFB, Del.; and Charleston AFB, S.C.) to Lajes, but from Lajes onward it was precise. Aircraft flew to Gibraltar at the southern tip of Spain and then followed a narrow path over the Mediterranean to Tel Aviv.

The route was deliberately placed along the center of the Mediterranean Sea on the Flight Information Region boundary line dividing the airspace of the hostile African states to the south and that of the "friendly" European states to the north.

Fighters All the Way

The threat of Arab interception was real, and the US Navy's Sixth Fleet acted as protector until the transports came within about 200 miles of Israel. There Israeli air force fighters took over. Although threats were made by radio, and several unidentified fighters were seen, no overt hostile action was taken.

Neither Lajes nor Lod possessed adequate aerial port facilities. Carlton called for establishment of Airlift Control Elements at both places, accurately estimating the number of personnel and the equipment that each would require. (More than 1,300 people would work at Lajes, seriously taxing all the facilities.) Other ALCEs were established at points within the US where aerial port facilities were not sufficient to handle the rush.

The initial missions to Israel were delayed as a result of 50-knot crosswinds at Lajes. Scheduled to be the first aircraft at Lod was a C-5 carrying the ALCE team, headed by Col. Donald R. Strobaugh. However, it encountered engine trouble and had to return to Lajes, where Strobaugh and his team transferred to a C-141.

The first C-5 (Tail No. 00461) to land at Lod touched down at 22:01 Zulu. It carried 97 tons of 105 mm howitzer shells, and it arrived at a time when Israeli forces were down to their last supplies of ammunition. Another 829 tons would be delivered in the next 24 hours. Even as Israeli workers unloaded those first cargo airplanes, huge formations of Israeli and Egyptian armor, maneuvering just 100 miles to the southwest, were locked in a desperate tank battle that would prove to be the largest clash of armor since the World War II Battle of Kursk.

Carlton was only too aware of the C-5's vulnerability to ground attack. Whenever possible, the Air Force would have only a single C-5 on the ground at any one time.

The first C-141 (Tail No. 60177) to arrive at Lod landed at 23:16 Zulu. The aircraft carried more ammunition but, more importantly, it delivered Strobaugh and his ALCE crew. The group ultimately numbered 55, all of whom worked 12 hours a day, seven days a week. They were given three 40K loaders as well as locally improvised unloading gear.

The arriving MAC airplanes were greeted ecstatically by the Israelis. The crews received red-carpet treatment. Israel put in place a system to expedite cargo handling; materiel unloaded from the transports usually were at the front in Syria in about three hours and in the Sinai in less than 10 hours.

The original 4,000-ton airlift requirement grew daily. After the first day, USAF set the daily flow requirement at four C-5s and 12 C-141s. After Oct. 21, it raised the aircraft flow level to six C-5s and 17 C-141s and maintained it there until Oct. 30, when the demand began to drop.

The continuous flow of aircraft on the long flights was tough on the aircrews, but MAC was judicious in its positioning of relief crews for the C-141 and using augmented crews on the C-5. A special pool of navigators was created for the vital but tedious task of navigating the Mediterranean.

To the Offensive

Because it eliminated the need to husband ammunition and other consumable items, the continuous flood of US war materiel enabled Israeli forces to go on the offensive in the latter stages of the war. In the north, Israel's ground forces recovered all territory that had been lost and began to march on Damascus. In the Sinai, tank forces led by Maj. Gen. Ariel Sharon smashed back across the Suez, encircled the Egyptian Third Army on the western side of the canal, and threatened Ismailia, Suez City, and even Cairo itself.

Egypt and Syria, which had previously rejected the idea of a negotiated settlement, now felt compelled on Oct. 22 to agree to the arrangement hammered out by Washington and Moscow with the goal of preventing the total destruction of the trapped Egyptian army. Israel was reluctant to comply immediately, wishing to gain as much as possible before a cease-fire.

The Soviet Union, faced with Israel's continuing offensive, raised the stakes. Moscow declared to the United States that, if the US could not bring Israel to heel, it would take unilateral action to dictate a settlement. On Oct. 24, the United States, in order to intensify the image of risk in Soviet minds and keep Soviet forces out of the crisis, responded by taking its armed forces to a worldwide DEFCON III alert, implying readiness for nuclear operations, if necessary.

Fortunately, after several abortive efforts, an effective cease-fire finally took hold Oct. 28.

Israel suffered 10,800 killed and wounded-a traumatic loss for a nation of some 3 million persons-plus 100 aircraft and 800 tanks. The Arab nations suffered 17,000 killed or wounded and 8,000 prisoners, and lost 500 aircraft and 1,800 tanks.

The airlift officially ended Nov. 14. By then, the Air Force had delivered 22,395 tons of cargo-145 missions by C-5 Galaxy and 422 missions by C-141 Starlifter. The C-5s delivered about 48 percent of the tonnage but consumed 24 percent less fuel than the C-141s. Included in the gross cargo tonnage was a total of 2,264.5 tons of "outsize" materiel, equipment that could be delivered only by a C-5. Among these items were M-60 tanks, 155 mm howitzers, ground radar systems, mobile tractor units, CH-53 helicopters, and A-4E components.

The airlift had been a key to the victory. It had not only brought about the timely resupply of the flagging Israeli force but also provided a series of deadly new weapons put to good use in the latter part of the war. These included Maverick and TOW anti-tank weapons and extensive new electronic countermeasures equipment that warded off successful attacks on Israeli fighters. Reflecting on the operation's vital contribution to the war effort, Reader's Digest would call it "The Airlift That Saved Israel."

Both US transport types distinguished themselves by performing reliably and economically. The C-5A had an 81 percent reliability while the C-141 registered a 93 percent reliability. No accidents occurred. The abort rate of all planned flights came in under 2 percent.

The airlift taught the Air Force many lessons, large and small. One was that Lajes was a godsend-one that the US best not take for granted in a future emergency. The Air Force established an immediate requirement for aerial refueling to become standard practice in MAC so that its airlifters could operate without forward bases, if necessary. Another lesson was that commercial airlines, on their own, could not be expected to volunteer their services and aircraft. This meant that access to commercial lift in the future would have to be met by activating the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, as in fact it was during the Gulf War. Nickel Grass also led to the consolidation of all airlift aircraft under Military Airlift Command and its designation as a specified command Feb. 1, 1977.

Finally, the C-5 proved to be the finest military airlift aircraft in history, not the expensive military mistake as it had been portrayed in the media. Its ability to carry huge amounts of cargo economically, carry outsize pieces of equipment, and refuel in flight fully justified the expense of the program.

"For generations to come," said Golda Meir not long after the war's end, "all will be told of the miracle of the immense planes from the United States bringing in the material that meant life for our people."


Тут много натяжек. Например А-4Е прибывали не в самолётах, а своим ходом.

"105 mm howitzer shells" - скорее 155мм

"Among these items were M-60 tanks, 155 mm howitzers" - вроде бы привезли 4 танка, в виде показухи. Гаубиц небыло.
Back to top
View user's profile Send private message Send e-mail Visit poster's website
Хамаш
Заслуженный Участник


Joined: 03 Apr 2002
Posts: 119
Location: Хайфа, Израиль

PostPosted: Sat Jun 21, 2003 1:26 am    Post subject: Reply with quote

Этап насилия над Гугелем я уже прошел Smile
Вот лучшая из ссылок что у меня есть: http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj89/krisinger.html

Quote:
The airlift to Israel lasted 32 days. Though not as large as the Berlin airlift, which carried more than 2 million tons of supplies to that city, the US airlift of 22,305 tons to Israel was impressive, nevertheless. The C-141s flew 421 missions to Israel, delivering 11,632 tons of equipment and supplies, while the C-5s flew 145 missions and delivered 10,673 tons of cargo. Some 48 percent of the total tonnage was moved on Galaxy flights, yet they flew only 25 percent of the missions.32 The Soviet airlift to Arab allies pales in comparison:



Но меня интересует именно более подробная информация. Расписание всех вылетов вместе с манифестом груза каждого (и судьбой каждого груза) - идеал (недостижимый, к сожалению).

_________________
Dixi.
Back to top
View user's profile Send private message
Олег Грановский
Главный редактор статей сайта


Joined: 10 Feb 2002
Posts: 24146
Location: Израиль

PostPosted: Sat Jun 21, 2003 1:28 am    Post subject: Reply with quote

Такого я не встречал.

Есть количества поставленной авиатехники, есть данные по 105мм танковым и 155мм и 175мм артилерийским снарядам (за весь период, без раскладки) - но это надо искать.
Back to top
View user's profile Send private message Send e-mail Visit poster's website
Хамаш
Заслуженный Участник


Joined: 03 Apr 2002
Posts: 119
Location: Хайфа, Израиль

PostPosted: Sat Jun 21, 2003 1:31 am    Post subject: Reply with quote

Quote:
"Among these items were M-60 tanks, 155 mm howitzers" - вроде бы привезли 4 танка, в виде показухи. Гаубиц небыло.


Да, в моей ссылке указано что прибыло всего 4, остальные прибыли после 22-ого (в собачий голос).
Вот насколько верно утверждение о том что Израиль был на исходе запасов, и без доставленных боеприпасов пришел бы нам крындец?

_________________
Dixi.
Back to top
View user's profile Send private message
Олег Грановский
Главный редактор статей сайта


Joined: 10 Feb 2002
Posts: 24146
Location: Израиль

PostPosted: Sat Jun 21, 2003 9:52 pm    Post subject: Reply with quote

Проблема была только со 175мм снарядами. Насколько я помню по тем таблицам, за время войны было израсходовано 2,000 снарядов из американских поставок.

Проблема была в следующем - с центральных складов боеприпасы отправляли на фронт. Склады регулярно докладывали об отгрузке боепприпасов и сколько осталось. Получалось, что запасы тех или иных снарядов исчерпаны. Реально же снаряды были, но "в трубах снабжения".

Основная роль воздушного моста сводилась к 2 пунктам:

1) уверенность правительства в завтрешнем дне - без поставок по воздушному мосту решение о форсировании канала в ночь 15/16 октября не было бы принято.

2) быстрое восстановление боеспособности АОИ после окончания боёв 24.10.73 (тем более что началась "война на истощение" - с Египтом до января 1974г, с Сирией до мая 1974г).
Back to top
View user's profile Send private message Send e-mail Visit poster's website
Олег Грановский
Главный редактор статей сайта


Joined: 10 Feb 2002
Posts: 24146
Location: Израиль

PostPosted: Sat Jun 21, 2003 9:56 pm    Post subject: Reply with quote

Я перенесу сюда вышеуказанную ссылку:

Quote:
Operation Nickel Grass

Airlift in Support of National Policy
Capt Chris J. Krisinger, USAF


ON 6 October 1973, while the state of Israel observed the Jewish holy day of Yom Kippur, war burst upon the Middle East. Egyptian and Syrian forces struck simultaneously against the frontiers of Israel in what would be the fourth Middle East war in 25 years. In his book The Arab-Israeli Wars, Chaim Herzog commented that the attack was the equivalent of the NATO forces in Europe being flung against Israel.1 Attacking in midafternoon, Egyptian forces crossed the Suez Canal at three points and moved into the Sinai Peninsula while, to the northeast, Syrian troops overran Israeli-occupied positions in the Golan Heights. After initial Arab successes, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) held and by 10 October counterattacked, first in the Golan Heights area, where they drove to within 30 miles of Damascus, and a week later in the Sinai, where they eventually pushed the Egyptians back across the Suez Canal.

The ferocity of the combat severely depleted the equipment and military stockpiles of both sides, and the need for resupply became urgent. The Soviets responded to requests Egypt and Syria and, while US observers looked on with growing apprehension, began airlifting military supplies into those countries aboard An-12 and An-22 transport aircraft.2 The United States delayed the resupply of Israel to conduct diplomatic negotiations with Moscow to restore peace in the area; however, it became apparent that those talks would succeed only by reestablishing the military balance through a massive resupply of war material to Israel.

US officials considered various delivery methods that did not require military airlift forces to enter the war zone.3 They rejected sealift because the prohibitively long time necessary for delivery would fail to meet Israel's urgent requirements. Airlift was the only viable alternative, and plans were quickly drawn to accomplish the necessary resupply. On 13 October President Nixon made the decision to begin the airlift, and on the following day the first US military transport, a C-5, landed at Lod International Airport, Tel Aviv. The American airlift, dubbed Operation Nickel Grass, was under way.4

By midnight on 14 November, one month later, the United States completed an airlift of immense proportions--an effort that played a decisive role in preventing the defeat of Israel.5 Although less publicized than the belligerents' combat operations, the aerial resupply efforts of Operation Nickel Grass were significant. For the United States, Nickel Grass had far-reaching political and military effects. From a broad perspective, the airlift may even have been an important as the Western allies' airlift that broke the Berlin blockade in 1948-49.

Militarily, the Israeli airlift was significant because it offset the Soviet airlift to Egypt and Syria, it overcame Israel's critical shortage in certain military items, and it strengthened Israel's overall military position. For the US Air Force, Nickel Grass was an important milestone in developing its ability to project and resupply forces with an all-jet transport fleet over intercontinental distances. In particular, the operation put the C-5 Galaxy to its first real test as the world's largest intercontinental airlifter. The events of Nickel Grass also provided the impetus for several significant enhancements to the airlift capability we know today: air refueling for airlift aircraft, upgrades in command and control, and realignment of airlift assets under Military Airlift Command (MAC).

Despite its military importance, the airlift probably had an even greater political impact because of the effects that extended beyond the immediate scope of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The political ramifications involved not only the relationship of the United States with Israel but also with the Soviet Union, the Arab countries (particularly Egypt), and NATO members. The success of the aerial resupply also supported the contention that airlift may be among the most flexible options available to the national command authorities (NCA) for the execution of national policy during peace or war.

Policy before Planes
The Israelis called for American aid almost immediately after the Egyptian army crossed the Suez Canal. Their request was denied on 7 October because of a consensus within the Nixon administration that "they didn't really need the equipment" and that they didn't suffer from shortages material.6 Officials in the administration, most prominent among them Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, also believed in an inevitable Israeli victory with or without resupply. Additionally, some people did not want to antagonize the Arabs because we depended upon them for some of our oil. Large oil companies warned against aid to Israel, fearing that the flow of oil would be halted--particularly to countries even more dependent on Arab oil than the United States.7 Also at stake was our status as a broker in the peace negotiations going on with the Soviets and with various Middle Eastern countries.

Regardless of these concerns, the US government found that maintaining the balance of power in the region was closely tied to the survival of Israel. Surprisingly, the United States was under no treaty obligations or formal protocols to supply Israel. Our commitments derived from a series of White House policy pronouncements issued by five successive presidents dating back to Harry S. Truman. These pronouncements indirectly linked the territorial integrity of Israel to the national security interests of the United States within the greater framework of peace and stability in the Middle East.8 Moreover, under the Nixon Doctrine, the United States favored support to friendly countries by providing the military equipment and supplies needed for self-defense.9

For Israel, resupply did not come as quickly as it had hoped. In dealing directly with the Israelis, the United States stipulated that it would provide military assistance only under certain conditions.10 First, Israel was not to have provoked the Arabs into starting the conflict. In a related requirement, the United States wanted assurance that Israel had not ordered a preemptive military strike against the Arabs, thereby initiating hostilities. Two events emphasize US intransigence on this issue: on the morning of 6 October, the US ambassador to Israel cautioned Prime Minister Golda Meir against a preemptive attack, stating that the United States could not resupply Israel under that circumstance; at the same time, Secretary of State Kissinger warned Israel's foreign minister not to initiate the fighting if Israel desired US support. Actually, Mrs Meir had already ruled out a first strike even though military intelligence indicated that an Arab attack was imminent. Yet another criterion for aid was that it would be offered only for self-defense. It is possible the United States established this condition so that the Soviets would perceive US military aid to Israel only as a counterbalance to Soviet aid to Egypt and Syria.

The US Departments of State and Defense had similar concerns for Soviet opinion and established their own conditions for aid to Israel.11 First, Secretary Kissinger did not want military aid to Israel to disrupt US relations with either the Arabs or the Soviet Union. Further, he wished to avoid damage to the ongoing negotiations over the Middle East situation or to the spirit of dйtente that existed with the USSR. Within the Department of Defense (DOD), Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger initially did not want MAC to deliver goods directly to Israel. Instead, he favored a covert operation in which MAC would fly supplies to the Azores for pickup by Israeli aircraft.

Because of these numerous conditions, the United States deliberated for nearly a week on whether to authorize military aid to Israel. After costly battles; particularly in the Sinai, Israel on 8 October again requested assistance from the United States. This time it asked for aircraft, tank and artillery ammunition, and electronic countermeasures (ECM) equipment.12 Despite a deteriorating battlefield situation, the United States was still reluctant to commit to a resupply, preferring to analyze the extent of Soviet efforts and determine its effect on dйtente. At this point, the United States gave Israel tacit approval for El Al, the Israeli airline, to begin moving supplies to Israel. Consequently, planeloads of bombs and air-to-air missiles arrive in Israel on 10 October.13

The Airlift
Takes Shape
Gen Paul K. Carlton, MAC commander, kept a close watch on the unfolding events. During the early part of the war, MAC was directed to provide a number of options for airlifting war material to Israel. Accordingly, MAC prepared its plans and waited for a political decision. In the following days, these plans changed repeatedly as the White House, National Security Council, and the Departments of State and Defense wrestled with the complexities of the war and its political and economic factors to determine the extent of US involvement.14

One of the options examined at various levels called for MAC to airlift cargo to the East Coast of the United States for transshipment by Israeli aircraft to the final destination. Another option was to shift the transshipment point to the Atlantic--Lajes Air Base in the Azores. Planners also considered using American commercial aircraft for the operation.15 The Israelis did, in fact use eight of their commercial B-707 and B-747 aircraft to move 5,500 tons from the United States to Israel but abandoned this effort because their fleet could not expeditiously move the necessary quantities of cargo.16

On 12 October 1973, before a final decision was made on the method of conducting the airlift, Mrs Meir personally sent President Nixon an urgent message requesting immediate assistance. At this point Israeli supplies were running critically low, and Israel's fate was in serious doubt. That day the president ordered DOD to immediately begin an airlift to Israel with cargoes destined for offload at Lajes Air Base. The next day, however, the secretary of defense directed that the US airlift would operate all the way into Israel using MAC aircraft and that Lod International Airport near Tel Aviv would be the offload point.17

Once the method of resupply was approved, the United States funneled large quantities of equipment and material through an aerial pipeline that stretched across the Atlantic and through the Mediterranean. To begin the supply transfer, crews onloaded equipment and supplies at 29 locations in the United States, principally military air bases.18 Equipment and materiel were also drawn from the stockpiles of US forces in Europe and airlifted to Israel.19

Once loaded, the transports began the approximately six-hour flight to Lajes Air Base. Lajes was the only available choice for landing and refueling because most European countries had denied overflight and landing rights to the United States, fearing that the Arabs would retaliate by withholding vital oil supplies.20 Serving as a staging base for the entire operation, Lajes handled 30 to 40 flights per day during the airlift.21 Base crews handled little cargo and were more involved in maintaining the aircraft and keeping the airlift moving. The C-5s and C-141s did not unload cargo here unless they could not continue due to mechanical problems. Rather, maintenance personnel refueled the aircraft, and fresh crews boarded the C-141s. Before leaving the United States, the C-5s were augmented with extra crewmembers who often remained with their aircraft to Lod and back to the United States, sometimes flying more than 28 hours without relief.22 At the peak of the airlift, 1,300 additional personnel crowded Lajes. They were billeted in World War II barracks, psychiatric wards, showers, and even aboard the aircraft. At one point, someone recommended that SAC tanker crews supporting operations and transiting Lajes bring their own sleeping provisions.23

Once the transports departed Lajes for Israel, they flew to a point over the Strait of Gibraltar, then east over the Mediterranean to the vicinity of Crete, then southeast to Tel Aviv. On 22 October 1973 MAC changed the route to fly south of Crete, to comply with a request from the Greek government. MAC exercise extraordinary care to comply with flight restrictions; even flights originating in West Germany were routed to Lajas, then through the Mediterranean to Israel. Aircraft were also careful to avoid overflying Arab territory or entering airspace controlled by Arab countries.24

Once in the Mediterranean, the US Navy's Sixth Fleet helped arrange codes, safe-passage procedures, and diversion plans in case of hostile interceptions. In fact, the Navy tracked the airlift aircraft from Gibraltar throughout the length of the Mediterranean. A ship was stationed every 300 miles and an aircraft carrier about every 600 miles to provide support, if necessary.25 As incoming aircraft approached to within 150 miles of the Israeli coast, Israeli Air Force (IAF) Mirages and F-4s escorted them the remainder of the way. Most of the transports landed at Lod Airport in Tel Aviv, while some flew to an airfield at El Arish in the Sinai. Overall, the flight time from Lajas to Israel was approximately seven hours.26

We had no support facilities at Lod Airport, and only a small number of US support personnel were present in Israel to assist with the aircraft. To coordinate a minimum maintenance capability for the transports once they landed, the US Air Force established an airlift control element (ALCE) at Lod, while El Al maintenance crews performed routine servicing for the aircraft. To unload the planes, the Israeli Defense Forces employed a mixture of reserve personnel and civilian teenagers enlisted as laborers from the surrounding area. Israeli teams of five to 10 men emptied the airplanes either by hand or with materials handling equipment (MHE) flown in on early chalks.* Interestingly, the first C-5 to arrive at Lod on 14 October had its 113,000 pounds of cargo unloaded by hand (in three and one-half hours) because the C-5 with the first MHE had aborted at Lajes.27 In addition, the IDF was responsible for loading the supplies and ammunition on waiting trucks and overseeing their distribution either directly to the combat units or to the IDF's main depots, depending on the type of materiel. Sources report that crews averaged 30 minutes to unload the aircraft and that IDF trucks left Lod Airport approximately 90 minutes after the aircraft landed, reaching their farthest destination about two hours later. Thus, the minimum total time from arrival of the supplies at Lod to their delivery was around 3.5 hours.28

* Chalks refers to the early troop carrier practice of chalking corresponding numbers on complete, individual aircraft loads and on the intended aircraft. The terms has entered general use as a means of identifying loads or missions.
Conditions at Lod were more difficult than at Lajes, not because of overcrowding, but due to a lack of US personnel. Col Donald R. Strobaugh, commander of the MAC ALCE throughout the operation, had only 12 cargo handlers and 20 communications workers when the airlift began. The number of ALCE personnel at Lod never exceeded 55 during the 32 days of the airlift. Colonel Strobaugh described working conditions at Lod in an article in the McGuire AFB, New Jersey, newspaper Airtides: "Our men did a fantastic job. They worked 12 hours a day--84 hours a week. Some worked more than that. If they started working on a plane at the end of their shift, they stayed on past the time they should have to finish the aircraft."29

The Israelis eagerly displayed their appreciation for the hard work of the ALCE and the aircrews that made the trip from the United States:


El Al Airlines did a great job taking care of the American aircrews at Lod. Tables with catered meals were set up in a special lounge for crew members. . . . El Al's chief stewardess went around Tel Aviv asking merchants for gift donations saying they were making it possible for their businesses to continue.30

Colonel Strobaugh also received 75 to 100 letters each day from Israeli schoolchildren. One typical letter read, "Thanks for helping us in our war. When you have a war, we will help you."31

Measuring
Airlift's Performance
The airlift to Israel lasted 32 days. Though not as large as the Berlin airlift, which carried more than 2 million tons of supplies to that city, the US airlift of 22,305 tons to Israel was impressive, nevertheless. The C-141s flew 421 missions to Israel, delivering 11,632 tons of equipment and supplies, while the C-5s flew 145 missions and delivered 10,673 tons of cargo. Some 48 percent of the total tonnage was moved on Galaxy flights, yet they flew only 25 percent of the missions.32 The Soviet airlift to Arab allies pales in comparison:

Best estimates of the Soviet effort were that their 935 missions, over a distance of 1,700 miles, moved in about 15,000 tons during a 40-day period. In short, MAC airlifted one-fourth more cargo with a little more than one-half the missions over a route that was three times greater.33

Overall, it appears that the American airlift had both substantive and psychological effects. The Israelis, who had begun to worry about how many shells they had left, were able to resume an extremely high rate of fire with the delivery of plentiful stocks of 105-, 155-, and 175-millimeter ammunition. With the influx of many of the consumables of war to replenish depleted stockpiles, they also were emboldened to throw all available reserves into the battle and succeeded in breaking through the Egyptian lines to the west side of the Suez Canal, threatening the bridgehead established by the Egyptians on the east side, and encircling the Egyptian Third Army.34 Psychologically, the Egyptians were shaken by this reversal of their military successes.

Another example of the impact of the airlift on the war was the effectiveness of the TOW and Maverick missiles. According to the Defense Intelligence Agency, these weapons were responsible for the majority of Israeli tank kills (Arab losses were estimated at 1,900 tanks during the war). Since the TOW and Maverick were not present in the Israeli inventory in any significant numbers before the war began, it is apparent that the missiles delivered by airlift the difference.35

Most accounts measure the airlift's performance in terms of tonnage moved, but it is more important to note what items were moved and their actual impact on the war. For example, only 39 percent of the Nickel Grass materiel was delivered before the cease-fire agreement on 22 October.36 Further, the C-5 was able to demonstrate its capability to transport outsized cargo--items too large for other transport aircraft.37

The movement of outsized cargo had different effects on the Israeli war effort but generally complemented the continual resupply of combat consumables. During the entire airlift, the C-5s delivered 29 battle tanks to Israel.38 Only four of those tanks along with 10 other pieces of outsized equipment arrived before the cease-fire on 22 October.39 The other 25 tanks were delivered after the fighting had stopped. Although 432 Israeli tanks were lost between 6 and 8 October during the armor battles of the Sinai, the Israelis did not overlook the psychological value of the airlifted tanks.40 The General Accounting Office (GAO) report on the airlift assessed the impact of the outsized cargo accordingly:

The aerial delivery of combat tanks and other outsize cargo by C-5s was an impressive use of airlift capability and it is impossible to assess the psychological impact of demonstrating this capability. In our opinion, the relatively small quantities of outsizing equipment delivered in this manner had no effect on the war's outcome.41

Facts and figures aside, American airlift "reversed the imbalance of military power created by the vast shipments of Russian war material to the Arab nations and led to a cease-fire which in turn brought about a return to the status quo. In short, the airlift possible the achievement of a national objective--peace in the Middle East."42

Nickel Grass and Its Mark on US Airlift
Capability
The Military Airlift Command received near-unanimous high marks for its performance under demanding conditions, but the operation was not entirely free of problems. Fortunately, MAC resolved these difficulties before they jeopardized the operation. Still, there were lessons to be learned. After the cease-fire, MAC officials examined these areas and gained insights that would benefit future airlift capability. Three areas requiring improvement were particularly prominent: (1) air refueling (AR), (2) command and control, and (3) management of airlift resources.

Need for Air Refueling

Although the C-5 could have carried a reduced load of 33 tons nonstop from the United States to Israel, the C-141 could not have flown this mission nonstop at all.43 Without the C-141, it would have taken 670 C-5 flights to deliver the same 22,305 tons to Israel. At the directed daily aircraft flow rate of six to eight arrivals per day, the operation would have taken 100 days.44 The C-5 has always been capable of in-flight refueling (the C-141 lacked this capability at the time of the operation); however, MAC did not use AR because of concerns about its effect on the aircraft's wing.45 Technicians later determined that AR would have put less stress on the wing than the extra takeoffs and landings. Further, the political climate in Europe prevented the United States from strategically positioning tankers to provide refueling for the return trip from Lod.46

Thus, the Israeli airlift was possible only because our aircraft were able to use Lajes Air Base. Although Portugal made Lajes available for this operation (after considerable negotiation), it is uncertain whether we will always have access to this facility. Therefore, an important lesson learned from the airlift is that implementation of our policy of remote presence requires an effective in-flight refueling capability. MAC and the Air Force have recently made great strides in this area. In fact, the current refueling capability of the C-141 and C-5, the procurement of the KC-10, and the commitment to training in air refueling all have their genesis in Nickel Grass.

Need for Improved
Command and Control

General Carlton described the problems of command and control during Nickel Grass in a 1984 interview:

The concept of operating within an established command and control structure was violated--the Air Force didn't set up a command post to handle our activity; yet, we were working for the Air Force. We found ourselves taking instruction primarily from JCS/J-4, Logistics. Command and control, or rather a lack of it, caused indecision.47

General Carlton went on to explain that, despite operating an European Command's (EUCOM's) theater of operations, the command "wasn't even in the equation for this operation."48 Instead of tying into EUCOM's command and control system, MAC aircraft transiting the Mediterranean worked indirectly with the Navy's Sixth Fleet through the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), as mentioned previously.

The GAO report on Nickel Grass further identified specific shortcomings in command and control procedures: (1) insufficient numbers of experienced people to manage emergency airlift operations, (2) inadequate communications facilities, (3) inaccurate and delayed reports to higher levels, (4) deficient dissemination of critical weather data, and (5) the lack of reliable, high-quality voice, air-to-ground, and secure communications.49 After the operation, each item was redressed through modernization of equipment or additional training and manpower.

Need for Improved
Management of Airlift Resources

The GAO report also made the point that "to manage an airlift efficiently, MAC should control the flow of aircraft."50 That is, MAC should specify the type of cargo and number of passengers to be moved and the time frames for movements. Then MAC should determine the type of aircraft, airlift flow, and methods of delivery best suited to meet the requirements. During the Israeli airlift, quite the opposite was true. DOD directed MAC's operations and frequently changed the aircraft flow rate. To comply with variable flow rate, MAC had to position extra aircraft and crews at Lajes and use them as directed. This procedure proved to be counterproductive to efficient management of aircraft, crews, and facilities. According to DOD, the secretary of defense controlled the airlift because political considerations were more important than efficient airlift management. However, DOD did agree that, to achieve economic use of aircraft, MAC should have a say in determining total airlift needs.51

Furthermore, MAC initially did not have access to the C-130 fleet to move small but critical loads to certain locations because these aircraft were either theater assets under the control of theater commanders in chief (CINCs) or CONUS-based assets under Tactical Air Command. Because of this situation, it wasn't until 15 October that 12 C-130s per day were dedicated to MAC for use, even though initial planning for Nickel Grass began on 6 October.52 As it turned out, these instances of doubtful airlift management were powerful arguments for airlift consolidation--which took place on 1 December 1974--and for designating MAC as a specified command on 1 February 1977.

Final Assessment

Along with the Berlin airlift of 1948 and 1949 and numerous other military and humanitarian emergencies, Nickel Grass takes its rightful place in proving that airlift is a key factor in America's military and diplomatic activities around the globe. MAC dramatically demonstrated its ability to organize quickly and transport vast amounts of cargo over global distances to support our government's policies. Furthermore, the fact that our effort exceeded the Soviets' did not go unnoticed in capitals throughout the world. Nickel Grass convinced many people that airlift is a vital component of our national strategy of deterrence: "The demonstration of capability and determination doubtless will not be lost on friend or foe and should prove of great value in underscoring the deterrence that is the cornerstone of American strategy."53 Perhaps the most meaningful assessment of our role came from Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir. During a private meeting in Washington with American Jewish leaders three weeks after the cease-fire, she emotionally commented that "for generations to come, all will be told of the miracle of the immense planes from the United States bringing in the material that meant life to our people."54

Notes

Chaim Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars (New York: Random House, 1982), 230.
William B. Quandt, Soviet Policy in the October 1973 War, Rand Report R-1864-ISA (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, May 1976), 18-27.
General Accounting Office (GAO), Airlift Operations of the Military Airlift Command during the 1973 Middle East War (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 16 April 1975), 7.
Charles W. Dickens, "The Israel Airlift," Airlift Operations Review, October 1979, 28.
Military Airlift Command (MAC) Directorate of Information, The Military Airlift Command's Role in the Israeli Airlift of 1973 (Scott AFB, Ill.: March 1974), 3.
Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1982), 408.
Kenneth L. Patchin, Flight to Israel: Historical Documentary of the Strategic Airlift to Israel (U) (Scott AFB, Ill.: MAC, Office of Air Force History, 30 April 1974), 23. (Secret) Only unclassified information used from this source.
Ibid.
GAO, 6.
George S. Maxwell III, "Israeli Defense Force (IDF) Logistics in the Yom Kippur War" (Thesis, Air Force Institute of Technology, 1986), 51.
Ibid., 52.
Kissinger, 491-96.
Maxwell, 53.
Patchin, 5.
GAO, 8.
Ibid.
Ibid., 7-8.
Ibid., 9.
Maxwell, 57.
Ibid., 54.
Ibid.
Dennis B. Dolle, "Operation Nickel Grass," Research Report 87-0700 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Command and Staff College, April 1987), 19.
Ibid.
GAO, 9.
Lt Col Robert Trimpl, "Interview with General Paul K. Carlton," Airlift, Winter 1984, 17.
Maxwell, 55.
Lt Col Charles E. Miller, Airlift Doctrine (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1988), 341.
Ibid.
"438th in Mideast: ALCE at Lajes and Lod," Airtides, 30 November 1973, 1.
Dolle, 20.
"438th in Mideast, 1.
MAC Directorate of Information, 4-6.
Patchin, 253.
"The C-5A and the Middle East Airlift," Congressional Record, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1975, pt. 9: 11211.
Dickens, 28.
GAO, i.
MAC Directorate of Information, 6.
GAO, 11.
Ibid.
Maxwell, 53.
GAO, 34.
Patchin, 249.
GAO, 30.
Ibid.
Miller, 342. For a provocative discussion of the C-5's wing problems, see Berkeley Rice's The C-5A Scandal (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1971), 151-61.
Dolle, 24.
Trimpl, 16.
Ibid., 17.
GAO, 32-33.
Ibid., 31.
Ibid.
Trimpl, 17.
Patchin, 259.
Ibid., 262.

Contributor

Capt Chris J. Krisinger (USAFA) is the editor of Airlift magazine, published at Military Airlift Command's Airlift Operations School, Scott AFB, Illinois. A C-130 pilot with than more 3,000 flying hours, he has served a tour at Pope AFB, North Carolina, and has been an exchange officer with Canadian Forces at CFB Edmonton, Alberta, Canada. Captain (major selectee) Krisinger is a graduate of Squadron Officer School and Air Command and Staff College.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
Back to top
View user's profile Send private message Send e-mail Visit poster's website
Uri Leizin
автор


Joined: 01 Apr 2002
Posts: 5429
Location: Израиль

PostPosted: Sat Jun 21, 2003 11:24 pm    Post subject: Reply with quote

А это что такое?

Another example of the impact of the airlift on the war was the effectiveness of the TOW and Maverick missiles. According to the Defense Intelligence Agency, these weapons were responsible for the majority of Israeli tank kills (Arab losses were estimated at 1,900 tanks during the war). Since the TOW and Maverick were not present in the Israeli inventory in any significant numbers before the war began, it is apparent that the missiles delivered by airlift the difference.35

Я как-то до сих пор думал, что:
1)TOW, "Маверик" и вообще ПТУРов в ЦАХАЛе перед войной не было - те немногие, которые применялись в Шестидневной войне, были сняты с вооружения из-за низкой эффективности.
2)"Маверик" в Израиль не поставлялся вообще. TOW, как новое и незнакомое оружие, пошли в применение не сразу, и в очень небольших масштабах - вряд ли ими было подбито более-менее заметное число танков, не говоря уж о большинстве.
Так что, "не так все было"?
И офф-топик, конечно, но раз уж речь зашла: я читал как-то в "Маарахот", что израильтяне импровизировали и устанавливали пехотные TOW на вертолеты (надо полагать, на "Белл-205"), насколько это верно, и есть ли какие-нибудь подробности?

_________________
Кто рано встает-тот всех достает!
Back to top
View user's profile Send private message
Олег Грановский
Главный редактор статей сайта


Joined: 10 Feb 2002
Posts: 24146
Location: Израиль

PostPosted: Sun Jun 22, 2003 12:58 am    Post subject: Reply with quote

То, что написано выше - бред. TOW прибыл в ходе войны, но не использовался (может под конец, 22-24 октября и было несколько пусков).

"Маверик" в Израиль поставлялся, см. статью:

http://www.waronline.org/IDF/Articles/air_force_weapons.htm

Там даже есть фото А-4 и Ф-16 с ним.

А об использовании - вот у меня есть заготовка для будущей статьи:

Quote:
Война 1973г - Израиль использовал 175 боеприпасов с электрооптическим (телевизионным - ТВ) наведением – планирующие УАБ «Хобос» (GBU-8 HOBOS – Homing Bomb System, вес 907 кг) и AGM-62A «Валли» (“Walleye”; вес 500 кг (1061 кг по другому источнику), в т.ч. 374-кг БЧ - 182 кг ВВ, дальность 25 (или 32) км) и около 50 AGM-65A «Маверик»(вес 209.5 кг, дальность 8км), а также около 200 ПРЛР AGM-45A «Шрайк». Процент попаданий составил 40% для «Хобос», 60% для «Маверик» и 80% для «Валли», а для «Шрайк» - всего 5-7%. Использовались и американские кассетные АБ Мк.20 «Роккай» и CBU. Сообщалось, что Израиль поразил УР и УАБ до ста танков противника, однако другие источники утверждают, что из изученных подбитых танков лишь 3 были уничтожены с воздуха, причём 2 из них – «Роккай» (для сравнения, в 1967г ВВС имели 5 подтверждённых поражений танков, причём добился этого без использования управляемого оружия). Некоторые источники хотя и подтверждают прибытие УР «Маверик» из США по «воздушному мосту», отрицают их применение в ходе войны. Все утверждения, встречающиеся особенно часто в российской литературе, об использовании Израилем ПТУР с вертолётов, особенно 14.10.73 (египетское наступление на восток от канала) не соответствуют действительности. Более того, к началу войны и у сухопутных войск ПТУР практически не было (на складах оставалось всего 27 боеспособных ПТУР SS-11, купленных в своё время у Франции; Израиль вообще не имел на вертолётах вооружения (кроме пулемётов для самообороны). В ходе боёв по «воздушному мосту» из США прибыли ПТУР «Тау», однако их использовали сухопутные войска, в очень малых количествах в самом конце или уже после войны.
Back to top
View user's profile Send private message Send e-mail Visit poster's website
Олег Грановский
Главный редактор статей сайта


Joined: 10 Feb 2002
Posts: 24146
Location: Израиль

PostPosted: Mon Jun 23, 2003 12:33 am    Post subject: Reply with quote

Вот обещанная таблица по боепприпасам. Графа "Куплено/получено в ходе войны" подразумевает как поставки из США, так и производство ИМИ.
Last edited by Олег Грановский on Mon Jun 23, 2003 1:05 am; edited 1 time in total
Back to top
View user's profile Send private message Send e-mail Visit poster's website
Олег Грановский
Главный редактор статей сайта


Joined: 10 Feb 2002
Posts: 24146
Location: Израиль

PostPosted: Mon Jun 23, 2003 1:03 am    Post subject: Reply with quote

Вот ещё кое-какие данные:

Параллельно с американским, действовал и израильский воздушный мост. 11.10.73 в Лоде приземлился первый гражданский самолёт Эль-Аль с грузами. Всего в ходе войны 167 рейсами (44 "Боинг-747" и 123 "Боинг-707") перевезено 5138 (5500 по другим источникам) тонн грузов.

Первый корабль с военными грузами отплыл из США 10.10.73. Всего по морю было перевезено (до какой даты - не указано) 80,000 тонн грузов, однако первый корабль прибыл в Израиль только в последние дни войны.

Первый С-5А сел в Израиле 14.10.73 в 22:01, а первый С-141 - 15.10.73 в 01:15.

Последний С-5А сел в Израиле 14.11.73 в 17:45, а последний С-141 - 14.11.73 в 17:12.

С-5А совершили 145 рейсов, С-141 - 422 или 421, перевезя 20,236 (или 22,395) тонн грузов. Примерно 10,000 из этого количества перевезли С-141. С-5 нёс в среднем 62т груза, С-141 - 24т. Разгрузка каждого самолёта длилась 0.5-1 час. Самолёты садились в гражданской части Лода.

Израильское название операции - "Маноф" ("Кран").

Операция по переброске в Израиль авиатехники называлась "Командо". Первые 8 F-4E сели в Тель-Нофе 14.10.73 (прямой рейс с дозаправками в воздухе из США), первые С-130Е сели в Лоде 14.10.73, а первые А-4 - 17.10.73. Всего до 14.11.73 Израиль получил 40 F-4E, 43 А-4 (старых моделей - E, F; 30 по воздуху, остальные морем), 12 С-130Е и несколько вертолётов CH-53D (частично - морем, частично внутри С-5).

В некоторых источниках говорится о 48 F-4E и 80 А-4, но по-видимому имеется в виду более длительный период.

В ходе войны прибывшие из США А-4 успели совершить 85 боевых вылетов (по другому источнику - 280), F-4E - около 200, и это по сравнению с 11,223 боевых вылетов, совершённых боевыми самолётами ВВС Израиля до 24.10.73 включительно.

Вновь прибывшие С-130 налетали в ходе войны 180 часов, а CH-53D начали летать только после войны.

Среди поставленных грузов были 100,000 105 мм, 87,000 155 мм, 17,500 175 мм снарядов. Запчасти, средства связи, контейнеры РЭБ, винтовки М16, РПГ М72 LAW, ПТУР "Тау", ЗУР "Хок", УР "Маверик", "Спарроу" и "Сайдвиндер", обмундирование, медицинское оборудование, пулемёты (по-видимому М2 и/или М1919).
Back to top
View user's profile Send private message Send e-mail Visit poster's website
Олег Грановский
Главный редактор статей сайта


Joined: 10 Feb 2002
Posts: 24146
Location: Израиль

PostPosted: Sat Oct 11, 2003 1:30 pm    Post subject: Reply with quote

Первый самолёт "Эль-Аль" с оружием сел в Израиле 11/10 в 06:30, первый американский самолёт - 14/10 в 22:01.

В книге Ронена Бергмана и Гиля Мельцера "Мильхемет Йом Кипур - Зман Эмет" ("Война Судного Дня - момент истины") нашёл интересные подробности по воздушному мосту (стр. 165-166): утром 11/10 Даян спрашивает Цви Цора (бывшый НГШ, а тогда помощник министра обороны) о налаживании моста. Тот среди прочего говорит, что американцы выделяют для этой цели 20 самолётов, плюс 7-8 самолётов "Эль-Аль". Уже прибыл самолёт с ракетами "воздух-воздух", утром ожидается прибытие самолёта с УР "Шрайк", а ночью - самолёта с 6,000 личными противотанковыми ракетами ("тилей нун-тет ишиим") - т.е. имеются в виду РПГ М72 LAW.

В 08:45 заместитель НГШ проводит заседание о обучении солдат АОИ, в ходе боёв, по использованию нового оружия.
Back to top
View user's profile Send private message Send e-mail Visit poster's website
Олег Грановский
Главный редактор статей сайта


Joined: 10 Feb 2002
Posts: 24146
Location: Израиль

PostPosted: Sat Oct 11, 2003 2:18 pm    Post subject: Reply with quote

А вот фото: первые М16 доставлены на фронт для раздачи парашютистам (по-видимому уже после прекращения огня 24/10).
Back to top
View user's profile Send private message Send e-mail Visit poster's website
Олег Грановский
Главный редактор статей сайта


Joined: 10 Feb 2002
Posts: 24146
Location: Израиль

PostPosted: Thu Oct 16, 2003 12:56 am    Post subject: Reply with quote

В книге Итан hабер, Зеев Шиф "Лексикон Мильхемет Йом hа-Кипурим" ("Энциклопедический словарь войны Судного дня" - похож на "Энциклопедический словарь Безопастности Израиля", но полностью посящён войне 1973г) приводит такие данные по воздушному мосту (2 статьи - собственно "Ракевет Авири" и "Мисрад hа-Битахон бе-мильхемет Йом hа-Кипурим"):

Всего, с начала войны до 14.10.73 - 744 самолёто-вылета, из США и Европы (тут наверное ошибка и имеется в виду 14.11.73; к тому же сумма не совпадает - 536 + примерно 170 = примерно 706).

Из США - с 14.10.73 по 15.11.73, 536 вылетов, 22,497 тонн, из них 40% (8,755 тонн) прибыли - до 24.10.73.

Израильский мост (из США и Европы) - 170 вылетов, примерно 5,500 тонн (в мирное время грузовые перевозки израильской гражданской авиации составляли около 500 тонн в месяц).

По воздуху прибывали в основном боеприпасы, запчасти, электроника.

Первые суда вышли из США 10.10.73 (хотя может в этот день только началась загрузка). До начала декабря США послали 16 судов с примерно 90,000 тоннами груза. Большинство прибыли в Израиль после 24.10.73 (для сравнения, СССР послали арабам около 340,000 тонн грузов).

Всего с 06.10.73 и до начала декабря поставлено вооружений на 0.8 млрд долларов: 40 "Фантомов", 46 "Скайхоков", 12 С-130 "Геркулес", 8 СН-53, 40 БПЛА, 200 М48А3 и М60, 250 БТР, 226 машин, 12 батарей ЗРК "Чапарэль" (тут не совсем ясно - каждая ПУ "Чапарель" может действовать автономно, так что может речь идёт о 12 ПУ; если же всё же о батареях по 4 ПУ - тогда это 48 ПУ - сомнительно), 3 батареи ЗРК "Хок", 36 155-мм орудия (скорее всего М109), 7 175-мм орудий (М107), большое количество 105-, 155- и 175-мм снарядов.

Большая часть авиатехники прибыли ещё в ходе войны, сухопутная техника - в основном после.

В ходе войны и вскоре после неё Израиль заказал в США технику, оружие и боеприпасы на 3.2 млрд долларов. Конгресс США выделил на финансирование закупок 2.2 млрд долларов, а президент США постановил, что из этой суммы 1 млрд будет подарком, а 1.2 млрд - долгосрочным кредитом.

Last edited by Олег Грановский on Tue Oct 21, 2003 1:13 am; edited 1 time in total
Back to top
View user's profile Send private message Send e-mail Visit poster's website
Хамаш
Заслуженный Участник


Joined: 03 Apr 2002
Posts: 119
Location: Хайфа, Израиль

PostPosted: Tue Oct 21, 2003 12:58 am    Post subject: Reply with quote

Олег Грановский wrote:
утром 11/10 Даян спрашивает Цви Цора (бывшый НГШ, а тогда помощник министра обороны) о налаживании моста. Тот среди прочего говорит, что американцы выделяют для этой цели 20 самолётов, плюс 7-8 самолётов "Эль-Аль". Уже прибыл самолёт с ракетами "воздух-воздух", утром ожидается прибытие самолёта с УР "Шрайк", а ночью - самолёта с 6,000 личными противотанковыми ракетами ("тилей нун-тет ишиим") - т.е. имеются в виду РПГ М72 LAW.


Странно, но это же об 11/10. Наверное, это были самолеты Эль-Аль, т.к. согласно американцам, собственно окончательное решение было принято Никсоном 12/10, а первые самолеты прибыли 14/10.

_________________
Dixi.
Back to top
View user's profile Send private message
Олег Грановский
Главный редактор статей сайта


Joined: 10 Feb 2002
Posts: 24146
Location: Израиль

PostPosted: Tue Oct 21, 2003 1:02 am    Post subject: Reply with quote

Я же и начал свой пост фразой:

Quote:
Первый самолёт "Эль-Аль" с оружием сел в Израиле 11/10 в 06:30, первый американский самолёт - 14/10 в 22:01.
Back to top
View user's profile Send private message Send e-mail Visit poster's website
Хамаш
Заслуженный Участник


Joined: 03 Apr 2002
Posts: 119
Location: Хайфа, Израиль

PostPosted: Tue Oct 21, 2003 1:11 am    Post subject: Reply with quote

Прошу прощения, слона-то и не заметил Embarassed

Кроме того, фраза:

Quote:

Тот среди прочего говорит, что американцы выделяют для этой цели 20 самолётов


Тоже несколько странно выглядит, учитывая что на тот момент американцы вообще еще не решили как и какими средствами они будут перевозить.

_________________
Dixi.
Back to top
View user's profile Send private message
Олег Грановский
Главный редактор статей сайта


Joined: 10 Feb 2002
Posts: 24146
Location: Израиль

PostPosted: Tue Oct 21, 2003 1:14 am    Post subject: Reply with quote

Возможно, это некая предварительная, ещё не утверждённая цифра.
Back to top
View user's profile Send private message Send e-mail Visit poster's website
Олег Грановский
Главный редактор статей сайта


Joined: 10 Feb 2002
Posts: 24146
Location: Израиль

PostPosted: Tue Oct 21, 2003 4:18 pm    Post subject: Reply with quote

О "Эль-Аль" в октябре 1973г.

Компания имела 13 самолётов - 10 Боинг-707/720 (3 Б-707-420, 2 Б-720Б, 5 Б-707-320) и 3 Боинг-747-200. Все самолёты были пассажирские, кроме 2 грузопассажирских Б-707-320 (конверционных - могли быстро перестраиваться из одной конфигурации в другую).

Скорее всего, все самолёты были исправны (хотя на 31.12.73 один Б-747-200 был неисправен, а на 31.12.72 было только два Б-747-200 - третий прибыл в апреле 1973г).

Точный список самолётов с указанием регистрационных номеров и точных моделей ("Блоков"):

1) 3 Б-747-258Б (4X-AXA, 4X-AXB, 4X-AXC - получены Эль-Аль новыми 26.05.71, 22.11.71 и 18.04.73 соответственно);

2) 2 Б-720-058Б (4X-ABA, 4X-ABB - получены Эль-Аль новыми 23.03.62 и 30.04.62 соответственно);

3) 3 Б-707-458 (4X-ATA, 4X-ATB, 4X-ATC - получены Эль-Аль новыми 22.04.61, 07.06.61 и 13.02.62 соответственно);

4) 3 Б-707-358Б (4X-ATR, 4X-ATS, 4X-ATT - получены Эль-Аль новыми 07.01.66, 02.02.67 и 22.01.69 соответственно);

5) 2 Б-707-358С - грузопассажирские (4X-AТX, 4X-ATY - получены Эль-Аль новыми 15.05.69 и 28.01.70 соответственно) - точное обозначение второго самолёта Б-707-358С (Н) - это был первый Б-707 с инерциальной навигационной системой Boeing Carousel III.

С началом войны из Б-707 были вытащены внутренности и самолёты начали участвовать в воздушном мосте. Персонал фирмы Боинг в Сиэтле провёл пересчёт разрешённой полезной нагрузки и поднял её с 42.3 до 57.15 тонн (с 94,000 до 127,000 фунтов). Пилоты набрали за 2 недели по 180 лётных часов - в среднем по 12 в день (многие пилоты были мобилизованы в ВВС, так что летали с теми кто остался, в основном с пилотами старше 40 лет; были мобилизованы и многие служащие наземного персонала - в целом Эль-Аль осталась с четвертю своего рабочего штата).

Кроме грузов, Эль-Аль перевезла более 22,000 пассажиров.

Среди погибших на фронтах было 16 служащих Эль-Аль, в т.ч. 9 лётчиков.

Источник: Marvin G. Goldman, "El-Al. Sky in The Sky". США, 1990г.

Комментарии:

Цифра нагрузки на самолёт для Б-707 выглядит сильно завышенной:

http://www.airwar.ru/enc/aliner/b707-320.html

23400 кг груза

http://www.airwar.ru/enc/aliner/b747-200b.html

69100 кг коммерческого груза (например 30 контейнеров LD-1)

Описание Б-707:

http://www.airwar.ru/enc/aliner/b707.html

Quote:
Модификации самолета:
Model 707-120B - развитие первоначального серийного варианта, получившего более мощные турбовентиляторные двигатели, аэродинамические улучшения крыла и хвостового оперения, которые были использованы и на Model 720.
Model 707-220 - в целом подобный первоначальному серийному варианту, но оснащенный двигателями Pratt & Whitney JT4А-3.
Model 707-320 Intercontinental - трансокеанский вариант с увеличенными размахом крыла и длиной фюзеляжа соответственно на 3,53 м и 2,03 м, оснащенный более мощными двигателями и вмещающий 189 пассажиров.
Model 707-320B Intercontinental - усовершенствованный вариант самолета 707-320 с более мощными турбовентиляторными двигателями и аэродинамическими улучшениями.
Model 707-320C Convertible - пассажирский, смешанный пассажирско/грузовой, или грузовой вариант самолета 707-320В с грузовой дверью и разработанной компанией Boeing системой погрузки.
Model 707-320C Freighter - грузовой вариант самолета 707-320С с удаленным снаряжением для размещения пассажиров.
Model 707-420 Intercontinental - в целом подобный самолету Model 707-320, но оснащенный турбовентиляторными двигателями Rolls-Royce Conway Mk 508.


Описание Б-747:

http://www.airwar.ru/enc/aliner/b747.html

Quote:
Модификации самолета:
Model 747-100В - Model 747-100 с усиленными фюзеляжем, шасси и крылом.
Model 747-200В - вариант 747-100В, но с другими двигателями и увеличенным запасом топлива; максимальный взлетный вес вырос до 377842 кг.
Model 747-200В Combi - Model 747-200В с расположенной по левому борту грузовой дверью, которую можно было использовать в пассажирской или грузо-пассажирской конфигурации, причем пассажиры и груз были отделены подвижной или съемной переборкой.
Model 747-200В Convertible - Model 747-200, оборудованная для использования в пассажирской или грузовой конфигурации, или в любой из пяти предопределенных грузопассажирских модификаций.
Model 747-200F Freighter - специализированный грузовой вариант самолета Model 747-200, носовая часть которого открывается вперед и вверх; имеется погрузочная система, которой могут управлять два человека; может устанавливаться грузовая дверь в борту фюзеляжа; максимальная полезная нагрузка 112491 кг (111 длинных тонн).
Model 747SP - вариант меньшего веса с увеличенной дальностью полета; длина фюзеляжа уменьшена на 14,35 м, а новое хвостовое оперение имеет увеличенную площадь; максимально вмещает 440 пассажиров; может перевозить 331 пассажира и багаж без посадки на расстояние 10841 км.
Model 747SR - Model 747-100В малой дальности, имеющая изменения в конструкции, позволяющие самолету взлетать и приземляться намного чаще.
Model 747SUD - модификация с удлиненной верхней палубой, которая также может иметься на вариантах 747-100В/-200В/-200В Combi и 747SR, и обеспечивающая места экономического класса для 69 пассажиров на верхней палубе, плюс дополнительные семь мест на нижней палубе.
Model 747-300 - заново построенная модификация самолета 747SUD.
Model 747-400 - модифицированный вариант с удлиненной верхней палубой, двигателями, созданными по последней технологии, "стеклянной" кабиной для двух человек, удлиненными законцовками крыла и уменьшающими лобовое сопротивление крылышками длиной 1,83 м.


Что касается Б-720, то это среднемагистральный самолёт, в США летать не мог.

http://www.airwar.ru/enc/aliner/b720.html
Back to top
View user's profile Send private message Send e-mail Visit poster's website
Олег Грановский
Главный редактор статей сайта


Joined: 10 Feb 2002
Posts: 24146
Location: Израиль

PostPosted: Sun Nov 02, 2003 3:48 pm    Post subject: Reply with quote

http://www.lcompanyranger.com/usweapons/50calpage2.htm

Quote:
Emergency supply of M2s to the Israeli Defense Forces during the 1973 Yom Kippur war was also a serious drain on supplies.
Back to top
View user's profile Send private message Send e-mail Visit poster's website
Vadim
Ветеран


Joined: 19 Mar 2002
Posts: 5144

PostPosted: Sun Jan 11, 2004 5:51 pm    Post subject: Reply with quote

..
_________________
Равенство, братство,
Дегуманизация!
Back to top
View user's profile Send private message
Олег Грановский
Главный редактор статей сайта


Joined: 10 Feb 2002
Posts: 24146
Location: Израиль

PostPosted: Sun Jul 25, 2004 9:22 pm    Post subject: Reply with quote

В журнале "Маарехот" н. 393, февраль 2004г, большая статья об операции (стр. 32-39).

Сообщается:
1) 8 самолётов Боинг-707/747 Эль-Аль перевезли 5,500 тонн грузов;
2) За 32 дня, до 14.11.73, было осуществлено 421 рейс С-141, перевезено 11,632 т груза и 145 рейсов С-5, 10,673 т груза, итого, 22,305 тонн. В среднем - 18 самолётов (т.е. рейсов) в день.

Эти цифры уже были приведены выше.

6-й флот США обеспечивал прикрытие трассы перевозки в зоне Средиземного моря - каждые 300 миль располагался корабль ВМС США, каждые 600 миль - авианосец (участвовали 2 авианосца - "Индепенденс" и "Рузвельт"). На расстоянии 150 миль от побережья Израиля начиналась зона ответственности Израиля.

15.10.73, в 07:00 в Израиле приземлился полковник Donald R. Strobaugh, американский командир операции. Под его началом действовал ALCE - Airlift Control Elements - 55 человек, работали без выходных сменами по 12 часов и более в течении 32 дней. В работы Голда Меир дважды посещала ALCE. Вообще-то ALCE должна была прибыть в Израиль с первым рейсом С-5, но из-за поломки двигателя этот самолёт сел на базе Лахас (Lajes) на Азорских островах, и ALCE прибыли в Израиль с опозданием, на С-141. Всего со стороны США в операции участвовали 689 человек, большинство на базе Лахас и на базах ВВС в США и только 55 - в Израиле.

Наземное обслуживание американских самолётов осуществляли техники "Эль-Аль". Разгрузка осуществлялась израильтянами - резервисты, гражданские и даже подростки. В среднем самолёт разгружался 30 минут, грузовики АОИ обычно покидали аэродром через 90 минут после приземления самолёта.

А вот самые интересные цифры: 43 рейсами С-5 было перевезено 72 "больших груза" (в основном танки и САУ), в т.ч. 29 танков. Но только 4 танка прибыли до объявления о прекращении огня.
Back to top
View user's profile Send private message Send e-mail Visit poster's website
Vadim
Ветеран


Joined: 19 Mar 2002
Posts: 5144

PostPosted: Tue Feb 22, 2005 7:58 pm    Post subject: Фото возд. моста. Reply with quote

Погрузка в AFB Dover.
"US airlift of 200 tons per day in C5A jets to Israel", "Time", 10/29/73.


Galaxy в Лодe.


Galaxy, Лод. "N.Y.Times".

_________________
Равенство, братство,
Дегуманизация!

Last edited by Vadim on Sat Apr 23, 2005 4:35 pm; edited 1 time in total
Back to top
View user's profile Send private message
Display posts from previous:   
This forum is locked: you cannot post, reply to, or edit topics.   This topic is locked: you cannot edit posts or make replies.   printer-friendly view Page 1 of 2 [40 Posts] Goto page: 1, 2 Next
View previous topic :: View next topic
 Forum index » Военное дело » Арабо-израильский конфликт
Jump to:  

You cannot post new topics in this forum
You cannot reply to topics in this forum
You cannot edit your posts in this forum
You cannot delete your posts in this forum
You cannot vote in polls in this forum
You cannot post calendar events in this forum


ÏÎ Õîñòèíã


Powered by phpBB © 2001 phpBB Group