Date Posted: February 12, 2003
JANE'S TERRORISM & SECURITY MONITOR - FEBRUARY 01, 2003
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Dirty bombs: threat and response
A. Oppenheimer
On 3 February, a 39-page UK Home Office document set out the roles and responsibilities of the emergency services to cover their reaction to a 'dirty bomb' and other types of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear attack. It is estimated that there is a 10 to 40 per cent chance that terrorists will conduct a successful attack with a radiological weapon ('dirty bomb') in the next five years. Several documents have shown that Al-Qaeda was successful, in theoretical and experimental terms, in developing nuclear and radiological weapons. Even after being disrupted by the US campaign in Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda is believed to be attempting to develop a nuclear capability.
A radiological dispersion bomb is the most accessible nuclear device for terrorists. It consists of waste by-products from nuclear reactors, or radioactive isotopes used in industrial radiography, medical radiotherapy, industrial irradiators and thermo-electric generators. The device would include a conventional high explosive such as semtex that, on detonation, would spew the radioactive material into the environment. Much depends on the amount and type of radioactive material used and the extent of, and conditions for, dispersal. Acute radiation hazard may be confined to a radius of a few hundred metres' around the site for a ground-level release, but long-term effects would include increased risk of cancer. Decontamination could cause major economic disruption. Apart from death and injury caused by the initial explosion, panic is the main immediate effect.
Radioactive waste material is located at more than 70 commercial nuclear power sites in 31 states in the USA. However, a single spent fuel assembly can be typically transported only in a shielded shipping cask weighing many tons. But if such a package could be acquired by terrorists or sabotaged during transport in an urban area, thousands of latent cancer fatalities could be the result.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and US Department of Energy has located five potent radiological devices in the former Soviet republic of Georgia. The devices, known as Gamma Kolos, are lead-shielded containers that hold large amounts of caesium-137. The Soviet Union dispersed the caesium canisters throughout Georgia to measure the effect of radiation on plants. According to the IAEA, the powdery radioisotope could be dispersed even without the use of a bomb. US personnel are in Moldova hunting for additional caesium containers.
In Russia, security for nuclear waste is especially poor, and the potential for diversion and actual use by terrorists is very real indeed. In 1996, to demonstrate Russia's vulnerability, Chechen rebels planted, but did not detonate, a device consisting of dynamite and caesium-137 in Izmailovo Park in Moscow.
Response to a dirty bomb: the UK
As civil emergency plans drawn up for the Cold War have been largely abandoned, during 2002 there was a desperate scramble in the UK to set up measures to prevent any attack or cope with its consequences. Local councils have been told to prepare contingency plans for a radiological attack. The Home Office document published in February states that while it is not inevitable that a terrorist attack will lead to high levels of contamination, the emergency services may have to deal with secondary devices and multiple incidents. The plans incorporate existing guidelines for the police, fire and ambulance services, the National Health Service (NHS), local councils, the Environment Agency and coroners in the event of a terrorist strike.
The police, firefighters and the military would rescue casualties from the 'hot zone', the area closest to the incident. Decontamination would take place in a surrounding area known as the 'warm zone', while a survivor rest centre and command and control vehicles would be in a 'cold zone'. The mass-decontamination methods could include low-pressure water spray from a fire hose, portable showers and the use of large, purpose-built mobile units as well as fixed facilities away from the scene.
In August 2002, the Department of Health confirmed that anti-radiation drugs have been stockpiled around the country as a precaution against a possible nuclear attack by terrorists. Potassium-iodide tablets, which are normally only kept near nuclear power stations, have been moved to secret locations (although not in hospitals) across Britain since the New York terrorist attacks of 11 September. However, potassium iodide would not protect against radiological devices made from caesium-137 or cobalt-60.
Government preparations for responding to major radiation incidents, including cross-departmental contingency plans, first emerged in a parliamentary written answer by the health minister, John Hutton, in August 2002. However, plans for the biggest shake-up of emergency planning since the Second World War to prepare against terrorist attacks will prove ineffective without millions of pounds of extra investment. In October, a report by the House of Commons Defence Select Committee criticised the slow progress of emergency planning reform. The seventh special report of the committee, published in late October, called on the government to bring in new civil contingencies legislation as "a matter of urgency".
A National Audit Office report found that the NHS is unprepared for a terrorist attack involving biological, chemical or radioactive weapons. Nearly a quarter of hospitals across Britain are unprepared for such attacks. In an October 2002 survey, nearly 40 per cent of hospital trusts said they were insufficiently prepared to cope with a nuclear or radiological attack. Problems included radios that failed because of faulty batteries, and plans for dealing with nuclear emergencies were untested in four-fifths of cases. Ambulance services were even less confident, with 38 per cent admitting that they were unprepared for a radioactive incident. The report also found that, despite ?5m of government investment, a shortage of protective suits, decontamination equipment and trained staff existed in many parts of the country.
The government's chief medical officer, Professor Sir Liam Donaldson, admitted in November 2002 that more was needed to prepare for terrorist attacks and said ministers were stepping up preparations: "No local manager in the NHS has ever had to deal with casualties from the release of a dirty bomb." He said exercises to simulate dirty-bomb and nerve-gas attacks would be staged to train emergency services and a poster campaign would warn the public how to react if radioactive material was released.
Response to a dirty bomb: the USA
The newly established Department of Homeland Security advises people to quickly move away from the immediate area of an explosion - at least several blocks away - and tune in to local radio or television broadcasts for instructions from emergency officials. The affected area would be cordoned off from surrounding areas and all people, buildings and surfaces decontaminated. This could take months. Many recommend shutting down external ventilation systems in the aftermath of an attack. An attack with radioactive material could cause enough panic to overwhelm local hospitals with people seeking treatment. The Department of Health and Human Services is recruiting hundreds of doctors to add to volunteer teams it maintains to respond to a terrorist attack.
Some believe that the cost of decontamination could exceed the value of the contaminated property and that it cannot be assumed that people will be willing to return to 'contaminated' areas. Even after an extensive clean-up, workers in Florida are still refusing to return to buildings that received anthrax letters in October 2001. Also, some radiological materials bind chemically to surfaces, making a large-scale clean-up very difficult.
The Food and Drug Administration has called on pharmaceutical companies to apply for licenses to market 500-milligram pills of Prussian blue (ferric hexacyanoferrate [II]) for treating suspected internal radioactive contamination with caesium-137. Prussian blue was used to treat 250 people in Brazil in 1987 after they were contaminated with caesium-137 abandoned after use in a cancer clinic.
As radiological devices explode in the same way as conventional bombs, all explosions would have to be monitored immediately for radiation. The National Nuclear Security Administration, which would respond to a radiological incident, plans to recruit more scientists to handle decontamination and evacuation, and to expand the Nuclear Emergency Search Teams to seek and destroy suspect devices. These ad-hoc nuclear-response teams can be called up from some 1,000 highly trained experts. Team members using gamma and neutron detectors would fan out along a matrix of the threat region to detect the bomb. Once found, the bomb is X-rayed and analysed to determine its characteristics. It would be surrounded by a tent enclosure several tens of feet in height and width, then filled with a special foam to contain the radioactive material if the bomb exploded during defusing.
Такие "грязные" бомбы логичнее применять точечно - в самых уязвимых,населенных,важных,транспортных и т.д. узлах. Ракета - ненадежно,неточно,при перехвате загрязнит арабов. Вывод - Ирак такое не применит. (Вообще,вроде грязной считается ядерная с низким КПД и кучей отходов).
Иран, СА, Пакистан(!! 
, душ с мылом-мочалкой. Опасна часто не прямая доза, а пыль (далее прямое поражение легких). Потом в магазин за водкой! 
