Корабельного ЗРК с 200км нет вообще. Американский "Иджис" (ракета "Стандард" в варианте SM-2ER Block 4) добивает до 137км, российский С-300Ф ("Риф", он же SA-N-6) - до 100 км.
Корветы "Саар-5"; РЛС EL/M-2248 MF-STAR и модернизация "Саар-5"
- Автор темы CaRRibeaN
- Дата начала
Противолодочный Саар - это Саар - 5 . На нём стоит стационарный корпусный сонар EDO-796 американского производства и буксируемый сонар производства Рафаэль .
Посмотри статью о ПЛ арабских стран + статью по истории ВМС Израиля. Там есть кое-что на эту тему.
А вообще 6 "Саар-2" были противолодочными. После их снятия с вооружения противолодочные системы перенесли на один из "Саар-4" - вроде бы "Ницахон".
Ну и "Саар-5", как уже было сказано.
Сонары импортные. В "Джейнз", правда сказано, что "Саар-5" в дополнении к импортному встроенному сонару несёт местную буксируемую антену - производства "Рафаэль".
![]:)](/fora/styles/default/xenforo/smilies/smilies_new/evilgreen.png "Evil ]:)")
Vadik>Пустить торпеду в ответ - в точку выпуска. Если "люди" не захотят сами торпеду в лоб получить - придётся маневрировать - а провода обрезать.
Вы вообще рассуждаете, или применительно к чему-то?
Определить точку пуска современной торпеды очень не просто - не сильно то они и шумят на скоростях 25 узлов скажем. Да и стрелять можно с таких расстояний, на которых обнаружение-поражение станет еще сложнее.
Vadik>А "тупую ГСН" - уж запутают...
Т.е. на авось?
Вы вообще рассуждаете, или применительно к чему-то?
Определить точку пуска современной торпеды очень не просто - не сильно то они и шумят на скоростях 25 узлов скажем. Да и стрелять можно с таких расстояний, на которых обнаружение-поражение станет еще сложнее.
Vadik>А "тупую ГСН" - уж запутают...
Т.е. на авось?
Пардон, не так выразился. Конечно не в точку а по направлению пуска. Т.е. обнаруживают торпеду на определённом пеленге, и пускают свою - по тому же пеленгу. Понятное дело, ПЛ после пуска попытается уйти, но если она будет продолжать вести цель с проводами,особо далеко она не уйдёт - провода помешают.
Я имел в виду - после того как провода наведения торпеды обрезаны - можно пускать в ход ложные цели, помехи и т.д., т.к. остаётся запутать только "тупую ГСН".Vadik>А "тупую ГСН" - уж запутают...
Т.е. на авось?
Vadim
Лучезарный колёс
UPDATED
Date Posted: 29-Jan-2004
Jane's Fighting Ships
EILAT (SAAR 5) CLASS (FSGHM)
IN SERVICE: 3
BUILDING: 1
Dimensions, feet (metres): 279.0 × 39.0 × 10.5
(85.0 × 11.9 × 3.2)
Main machinery: CODOG; 1 GE LM 2500 gas turbine; 30,000 hp (22.38 MW) sustained; 2 MTU 12V 1163 TB82 diesels; 6,600 hp(m) (4.86 MW) sustained; 2 shafts; Kamewa cp props
Speed, knots: 33 gas; 20 diesels. Range, miles: 3,500 at 17 kt
Complement: 64 (16 officers) plus 10 (4 officers) aircrew
Missiles: SSM: 8 McDonnell Douglas Harpoon (2 quad) launchers [Ref 1]; active radar homing to 130 km (70 n miles) at 0.9 Mach; warhead 227 kg.
SAM: 2 Israeli Industries Barak I (vertical launch) [Ref 2]; 2 × 32 cells; command line of sight radar or optical guidance to 10 km (5.5 n miles) at 2 Mach; warhead 22 kg (see Operational).
Guns: OTO Melara 3 in (76 mm)/62 compact [Ref 3]; 85 rds/min to 16 km (8.7 n miles); weight of shell 6 kg.
The main gun is interchangeable with a Bofors 57 mm gun or Vulcan Phalanx CIWS [Ref 4].
2 Sea Vulcan 20 mm CIWS [Ref 5]; range 1 km.
Torpedoes: 6-324 mm Mk 32 (2 triple) tubes [Ref 6]. Honeywell Mk 46; anti-submarine; active/passive homing to 11 km (5.9 n miles) at 40 kt; warhead 44 kg. Mounted in the superstructure.
Countermeasures: Decoys: 3 Elbit/Deseaver 72-barrelled chaff and IR launchers [Ref 7]; Rafael ATC-1 towed torpedo decoy.
ESM: Elisra NS 9003; intercept. Tadiran NATACS.
ECM: 2 Rafael 1010; Elisra NS 9005; jammers.
Combat data systems: Elbit NTCCS using Elta EL/S-9000 computers. Reshet datalink.
Weapons control: 2 Elop MSIS optronic directors [Ref 8].
Radars: Air search: Elta EL/M-2218S [Ref 9]; E/F-band.
Surface search: Cardion SPS-55 [Ref 10]; I-band.
Navigation: I-band.
Fire control: 3 Elta EL/M-2221 GM STGR [Ref 11]; I/K/J-band.
Sonars: EDO Type 796 Mod 1; hull-mounted; search and attack; medium frequency.
Rafael towed array (fitted for).
Helicopters: 1 Dauphin SA 366G [Ref 12] or Sea Panther can be carried.
Programmes: A design by John J McMullen Associates Inc for Israeli Shipyards, Haifa in conjunction with Ingalls Shipbuilding Division of Litton Corporation which was authorised to act as main contractor using FMS funding. Contract awarded 8 February 1989. All delivered to Israel for combat system installation, first two completed in 1996 and last one in mid-1997. Major refits of these ships is reported to be under consideration. Plans to procure a further five new ships (SAAR 5+) under similar FMS funding are now unlikely to be taken forward in view of the requirement for multimission ships. However, the option for a fourth SAAR 5 may have been taken up although the construction programme remains speculative.
Structure: Steel hull and aluminium superstructure. Stealth features including resilient mounts for main machinery, funnel exhaust cooling, Radar Absorbent Material (RAM), NBC washdown and Prairie Masker Bubbler system. A secondary operations room is fitted aft. There are some Flag capabilities. Plans to carry Gabriel SSMs have been scrapped because of topweight problems. The planned third MSIS director has not yet been seen on the platform aft of the air search radar.
Operational: Endurance, 20 days. The main role is to counter threats in shipping routes. ICS-2 integrated communications system. The position of the satellite aerial suggests that the SAM after VLS launchers are not used. Barak has still to be installed, because of lack of funds. For the same reason the normal Harpoon load may be reduced to four.
EILAT - (Scale 1 : 900), Ian Sturton
Eilat-class corvette
01-Aug-1996 Saar 5 corvette
INS EILAT
EILAT (with Phalanx vice 76 mm gun) 1/1994
EILAT
HANIT - 12/2001
HANIT - 12/2001
LAHAV and HANIT 6/1995
Israeli 'Saar 5' class missile corvette constructed to the Ingalls design. Major components of weapons and sensor fit are missing in this photograph (NGSS) (2003)
Date Posted: 29-Jan-2004
Jane's Fighting Ships
EILAT (SAAR 5) CLASS (FSGHM)
IN SERVICE: 3
BUILDING: 1
Displacement, tons: 1,075 standard; 1,295 full load
Dimensions, feet (metres): 279.0 × 39.0 × 10.5
(85.0 × 11.9 × 3.2)
Main machinery: CODOG; 1 GE LM 2500 gas turbine; 30,000 hp (22.38 MW) sustained; 2 MTU 12V 1163 TB82 diesels; 6,600 hp(m) (4.86 MW) sustained; 2 shafts; Kamewa cp props
Speed, knots: 33 gas; 20 diesels. Range, miles: 3,500 at 17 kt
Complement: 64 (16 officers) plus 10 (4 officers) aircrew
Missiles: SSM: 8 McDonnell Douglas Harpoon (2 quad) launchers [Ref 1]; active radar homing to 130 km (70 n miles) at 0.9 Mach; warhead 227 kg.
SAM: 2 Israeli Industries Barak I (vertical launch) [Ref 2]; 2 × 32 cells; command line of sight radar or optical guidance to 10 km (5.5 n miles) at 2 Mach; warhead 22 kg (see Operational).
Guns: OTO Melara 3 in (76 mm)/62 compact [Ref 3]; 85 rds/min to 16 km (8.7 n miles); weight of shell 6 kg.
The main gun is interchangeable with a Bofors 57 mm gun or Vulcan Phalanx CIWS [Ref 4].
2 Sea Vulcan 20 mm CIWS [Ref 5]; range 1 km.
Torpedoes: 6-324 mm Mk 32 (2 triple) tubes [Ref 6]. Honeywell Mk 46; anti-submarine; active/passive homing to 11 km (5.9 n miles) at 40 kt; warhead 44 kg. Mounted in the superstructure.
Countermeasures: Decoys: 3 Elbit/Deseaver 72-barrelled chaff and IR launchers [Ref 7]; Rafael ATC-1 towed torpedo decoy.
ESM: Elisra NS 9003; intercept. Tadiran NATACS.
ECM: 2 Rafael 1010; Elisra NS 9005; jammers.
Combat data systems: Elbit NTCCS using Elta EL/S-9000 computers. Reshet datalink.
Weapons control: 2 Elop MSIS optronic directors [Ref 8].
Radars: Air search: Elta EL/M-2218S [Ref 9]; E/F-band.
Surface search: Cardion SPS-55 [Ref 10]; I-band.
Navigation: I-band.
Fire control: 3 Elta EL/M-2221 GM STGR [Ref 11]; I/K/J-band.
Sonars: EDO Type 796 Mod 1; hull-mounted; search and attack; medium frequency.
Rafael towed array (fitted for).
Helicopters: 1 Dauphin SA 366G [Ref 12] or Sea Panther can be carried.
Programmes: A design by John J McMullen Associates Inc for Israeli Shipyards, Haifa in conjunction with Ingalls Shipbuilding Division of Litton Corporation which was authorised to act as main contractor using FMS funding. Contract awarded 8 February 1989. All delivered to Israel for combat system installation, first two completed in 1996 and last one in mid-1997. Major refits of these ships is reported to be under consideration. Plans to procure a further five new ships (SAAR 5+) under similar FMS funding are now unlikely to be taken forward in view of the requirement for multimission ships. However, the option for a fourth SAAR 5 may have been taken up although the construction programme remains speculative.
Structure: Steel hull and aluminium superstructure. Stealth features including resilient mounts for main machinery, funnel exhaust cooling, Radar Absorbent Material (RAM), NBC washdown and Prairie Masker Bubbler system. A secondary operations room is fitted aft. There are some Flag capabilities. Plans to carry Gabriel SSMs have been scrapped because of topweight problems. The planned third MSIS director has not yet been seen on the platform aft of the air search radar.
Operational: Endurance, 20 days. The main role is to counter threats in shipping routes. ICS-2 integrated communications system. The position of the satellite aerial suggests that the SAM after VLS launchers are not used. Barak has still to be installed, because of lack of funds. For the same reason the normal Harpoon load may be reduced to four.
EILAT - (Scale 1 : 900), Ian Sturton
Eilat-class corvette
01-Aug-1996 Saar 5 corvette
INS EILAT
EILAT (with Phalanx vice 76 mm gun) 1/1994
EILAT
HANIT - 12/2001
HANIT - 12/2001
LAHAV and HANIT 6/1995
Israeli 'Saar 5' class missile corvette constructed to the Ingalls design. Major components of weapons and sensor fit are missing in this photograph (NGSS) (2003)
LCP Type
Landing Craft Personnel
1
1968
Ashdod
Landing Craft Tank
3
1966/67
............
© 2002 Jane's Information Group
Народ, так есть у нас десантные корабли или нет?
Landing Craft Personnel
1
1968
Ashdod
Landing Craft Tank
3
1966/67
............
© 2002 Jane's Information Group
Народ, так есть у нас десантные корабли или нет?
Вроде УЖЕ нет.
На 1995г этот список ещё был верен.
Vadim
Лучезарный колёс
Defense & Foreign Affairs' Strategic Policy
March, 2002
SECTION: EN CLAIRE; A Monthly Report on Issues of Strategic Significance; Pg. 3
Israel Navy Now Element of Strategic Force Projection
Reports that the Israel Defense Force (IDF) plans to add a more strategic aspect to its function is believed to be correct and, in the view of many, surprisingly late in coming. In the past, the IDF has undertaken strategic military operations, with all three services prepared, essentially, to operate almost anywhere in the region to "do what is necessary". However, the proposed creation of a specifically strategic deep-strike function for the Israeli Navy (IN: the Heyl ha-Yam) is seen as a highly-significant development.
The IN has received Government approval to proceed with a plan to develop the force into a deep-strike force. Specifically, the plan reportedly called for the conversion of "existing frigates and submarines" as well as the procurement of new surface vessels and underwater vessels, with the capability of reaching into the Indian Ocean and capable of responding to "threats from Iran, Iraq and Libya". Significantly, the IN has for some decades maintained a force which has had true blue water potential, and has operated routinely down to the Bab el-Mandeb Straits at the southern end of the Red Sea. It has always maintained an ability to operate throughout the Mediterranean. The news reports, however, missed the point that (a) much of the new, much broader strategic strike capability has already become operational, and (b) there is no funding available for additional platforms or systems of any great magnitude.
What had appeared to be lacking in the past was an overall maritime force projection strategy, tied into the Israeli Air Force's existing long-range strike capability. The asset base for a greater strategic power projection role for the IDF has not been lacking (despite the constant and chronic lack of funding, particularly for long-term Navy projects); what was necessary was to have a national leadership oriented toward moving the national defense out into the strategic realm. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's strategic viewpoint has always been to move the defensive position of Israel as far out from the borders as possible. Given the regional proliferation of theater-range ballistic missiles (in particular the No Dong Is of Libya, and their equivalents in Iraq and Iran), and the growing moves toward nuclear, chemical and biological warheads, it was now critical for Israel to be able to counter as much of the threat as possible at source.
The Israel Navy's three Dolpheen (Dolphin)-class (Type 212 variant) submarines (SSKs) were already equipped with Sub-Harpoon anti-shipping missiles. The lead-ship, the Dolphin, was delivered in early 1999, with the last unit, the Tekuma, delivered in late 2000. Since delivery, the entire Dolphin-class has been undergoing refits to be able to fire submerged-launch cruise missiles for the land-attack mission. This capability gives the IN a stand-off capability which could be used in the Arabian Sea against critical Iranian shore-based and maritime assets and from the Persian Gulf against Iranian and Iraqi land targets.
Israel in 1999 began lobbying the US to provide Tomahawk cruise missiles to Israel, a fact which was confirmed by a report in the Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz on October 14, 2000. At that time, Israel was hopeful that an accord could be reached with Syria. Ha'aretz noted: "Israel sees the Tomahawk as a central tool in its defense policy after peace is reached with Syria." The newspaper went on: "American officials denied yesterday [October 13, 2000] a report in Defense News that the [US] Administration has already refused to give Tomahawks to Israel. The final decision will come in due time, between [then-US Pres. William] Clinton and [then-Israeli Prime Minister Ehud] Barak, and Israel will probably agree to certain restrictions or to American supervision of the cruise missiles, as long as it can take possession of them." So this development has been underway for some time, highlighting the fact that Israel has been preparing for a more strategic mission for the Navy. The latest move, toward the formulation of a coherent plan to codify strategic missions as part of national strategy, was, therefore a logical progression. The fact that any possible chance of an Israeli peace with Syria was lost only compounded the need, from Israel's perspective, to hasten the acquisition of Tomahawks, or a locally-developed alternative.
What has not been stated in any open source material, however, is the fact that the Israeli SLCM is now operationally deployed.
This would make any acquisition of US Tomahawks only important as a supplement to the locally-produced missiles, assisting in the financial drain on the Israeli budget. However, it is axiomatic that an Israeli Tomahawk or a locally-produced cruise missile would be nuclear capable, especially given the understanding that Israeli nuclear weapons have successfully been miniaturized.
Israel undertook, in May 2000, test firings of indigenous cruise missiles from two of its Dolpheen-class SSKs. The test firings took place off Sri Lanka, which is already close to Israel (in a defense supply relationship from Israel), and was also conducted in conjunction with the Indian Navy, with which Israel also has close ties. Range of the missiles launched from the Dolpheens was said to be 1,500km [about 930 statute miles]. The Israeli Government denied the reports about the firings, but Defense & Foreign Affairs sources in India and Israel have both confirmed the fact that such tests took place.
The Israeli air-launched cruise missile, the Popeye Turbo, expected to become operational in 2002, was believed to have provided the model for the submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM), despite the fact that the air-launched version (ALCM) was believed to have a shorter range (200km plus). There are various earlier variants of the Popeye in service with the Israeli Air Force: the AGM-142 Have Nap is a variant of the IAF Popeye and this uses a solid propellant rocket motor. The later Popeye II Have Lite, is smaller, benefiting from later miniaturizations of technology and is used on tactical aircraft. The evolution of the Popeye family believed to have been used for the Israeli SLCM -- and potentially for a surface warship-launched variant -- conforms to the specifications for the Tomahawk and Russian SS-N-21, enabling launch through the standard torpedo tubes.
It is understood that IDF Chief of Staff, Lt.-Gen. Shaul Mofaz, in January 2002 approved the drafting of a formal proposal by the Navy for the broader strategic mission, and approved its discussions in both the General Staff and the Government. The reports talked about converting "existing frigates and submarines". The nearest vessels which the Heyl ha-Yam has to frigates are the three Eilat-class (Saar V-class) FFLs (light frigates, or corvettes) with 2x4 Harpoon SSMs, 2x32 cell VL Barak I SAMs, 1 Mk.15 Phalanx CIWS, 2x1 Stinger MANPADS, 2x3 Mk32 ASW torpedo tubes, and 1 AS.365 Dauphin helicopter. These exceptionally capable vessels are all Mediterranean-based, allowing two to be on patrol at any given time, with one laid-up for refit.
March, 2002
SECTION: EN CLAIRE; A Monthly Report on Issues of Strategic Significance; Pg. 3
Israel Navy Now Element of Strategic Force Projection
Reports that the Israel Defense Force (IDF) plans to add a more strategic aspect to its function is believed to be correct and, in the view of many, surprisingly late in coming. In the past, the IDF has undertaken strategic military operations, with all three services prepared, essentially, to operate almost anywhere in the region to "do what is necessary". However, the proposed creation of a specifically strategic deep-strike function for the Israeli Navy (IN: the Heyl ha-Yam) is seen as a highly-significant development.
The IN has received Government approval to proceed with a plan to develop the force into a deep-strike force. Specifically, the plan reportedly called for the conversion of "existing frigates and submarines" as well as the procurement of new surface vessels and underwater vessels, with the capability of reaching into the Indian Ocean and capable of responding to "threats from Iran, Iraq and Libya". Significantly, the IN has for some decades maintained a force which has had true blue water potential, and has operated routinely down to the Bab el-Mandeb Straits at the southern end of the Red Sea. It has always maintained an ability to operate throughout the Mediterranean. The news reports, however, missed the point that (a) much of the new, much broader strategic strike capability has already become operational, and (b) there is no funding available for additional platforms or systems of any great magnitude.
What had appeared to be lacking in the past was an overall maritime force projection strategy, tied into the Israeli Air Force's existing long-range strike capability. The asset base for a greater strategic power projection role for the IDF has not been lacking (despite the constant and chronic lack of funding, particularly for long-term Navy projects); what was necessary was to have a national leadership oriented toward moving the national defense out into the strategic realm. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's strategic viewpoint has always been to move the defensive position of Israel as far out from the borders as possible. Given the regional proliferation of theater-range ballistic missiles (in particular the No Dong Is of Libya, and their equivalents in Iraq and Iran), and the growing moves toward nuclear, chemical and biological warheads, it was now critical for Israel to be able to counter as much of the threat as possible at source.
The Israel Navy's three Dolpheen (Dolphin)-class (Type 212 variant) submarines (SSKs) were already equipped with Sub-Harpoon anti-shipping missiles. The lead-ship, the Dolphin, was delivered in early 1999, with the last unit, the Tekuma, delivered in late 2000. Since delivery, the entire Dolphin-class has been undergoing refits to be able to fire submerged-launch cruise missiles for the land-attack mission. This capability gives the IN a stand-off capability which could be used in the Arabian Sea against critical Iranian shore-based and maritime assets and from the Persian Gulf against Iranian and Iraqi land targets.
Israel in 1999 began lobbying the US to provide Tomahawk cruise missiles to Israel, a fact which was confirmed by a report in the Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz on October 14, 2000. At that time, Israel was hopeful that an accord could be reached with Syria. Ha'aretz noted: "Israel sees the Tomahawk as a central tool in its defense policy after peace is reached with Syria." The newspaper went on: "American officials denied yesterday [October 13, 2000] a report in Defense News that the [US] Administration has already refused to give Tomahawks to Israel. The final decision will come in due time, between [then-US Pres. William] Clinton and [then-Israeli Prime Minister Ehud] Barak, and Israel will probably agree to certain restrictions or to American supervision of the cruise missiles, as long as it can take possession of them." So this development has been underway for some time, highlighting the fact that Israel has been preparing for a more strategic mission for the Navy. The latest move, toward the formulation of a coherent plan to codify strategic missions as part of national strategy, was, therefore a logical progression. The fact that any possible chance of an Israeli peace with Syria was lost only compounded the need, from Israel's perspective, to hasten the acquisition of Tomahawks, or a locally-developed alternative.
What has not been stated in any open source material, however, is the fact that the Israeli SLCM is now operationally deployed.
This would make any acquisition of US Tomahawks only important as a supplement to the locally-produced missiles, assisting in the financial drain on the Israeli budget. However, it is axiomatic that an Israeli Tomahawk or a locally-produced cruise missile would be nuclear capable, especially given the understanding that Israeli nuclear weapons have successfully been miniaturized.
Israel undertook, in May 2000, test firings of indigenous cruise missiles from two of its Dolpheen-class SSKs. The test firings took place off Sri Lanka, which is already close to Israel (in a defense supply relationship from Israel), and was also conducted in conjunction with the Indian Navy, with which Israel also has close ties. Range of the missiles launched from the Dolpheens was said to be 1,500km [about 930 statute miles]. The Israeli Government denied the reports about the firings, but Defense & Foreign Affairs sources in India and Israel have both confirmed the fact that such tests took place.
The Israeli air-launched cruise missile, the Popeye Turbo, expected to become operational in 2002, was believed to have provided the model for the submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM), despite the fact that the air-launched version (ALCM) was believed to have a shorter range (200km plus). There are various earlier variants of the Popeye in service with the Israeli Air Force: the AGM-142 Have Nap is a variant of the IAF Popeye and this uses a solid propellant rocket motor. The later Popeye II Have Lite, is smaller, benefiting from later miniaturizations of technology and is used on tactical aircraft. The evolution of the Popeye family believed to have been used for the Israeli SLCM -- and potentially for a surface warship-launched variant -- conforms to the specifications for the Tomahawk and Russian SS-N-21, enabling launch through the standard torpedo tubes.
It is understood that IDF Chief of Staff, Lt.-Gen. Shaul Mofaz, in January 2002 approved the drafting of a formal proposal by the Navy for the broader strategic mission, and approved its discussions in both the General Staff and the Government. The reports talked about converting "existing frigates and submarines". The nearest vessels which the Heyl ha-Yam has to frigates are the three Eilat-class (Saar V-class) FFLs (light frigates, or corvettes) with 2x4 Harpoon SSMs, 2x32 cell VL Barak I SAMs, 1 Mk.15 Phalanx CIWS, 2x1 Stinger MANPADS, 2x3 Mk32 ASW torpedo tubes, and 1 AS.365 Dauphin helicopter. These exceptionally capable vessels are all Mediterranean-based, allowing two to be on patrol at any given time, with one laid-up for refit.
Vadim
Лучезарный колёс
DEFENSE DAILY
January 18, 2002
SECTION: Vol. 213, No. 12
Northrop Grumman Looking To Upgrade Israel's Saar V Corvettes
By Neil Baumgardner
Northrop Grumman [NOC], coming off its $5 billion acquisition last year
of Litton, is looking forward to a possible upgrade of Israel's Eilat-class
(Saar V) corvettes that were made at the company's Ingalls Shipyard in
Pascagoula, Miss., as well as the production of further vessels for Israel,
according to a company official.
"We are moving out with the Israelis right now on the Saar V Plus,"
Richard Schenk, the vice president for business development with Northrop
Grumman Ship Systems, yesterday told Defense Daily during the Surface Navy
Association's annual symposium in Arlington, Va. "We've finished our
negotiations and are very close to having something completely in place to move
forward on conducting a feasibility study to look at upgrading existing Saar V
design to meet some new missions."
Ingalls built three Saar V corvettes for the Israeli navy in the early
1990s. One of few ships built entirely for foreign military sale by a U.S.
shipyard, the vessels are equipped with Boeing [BA] Harpoon anti-ship missiles,
the Israeli Barak vertical launch system and Raytheon's [RTN] Phalanx close-in
weapon system. According to Schenk, Northrop Grumman is looking at the
possibility of adding greater command and control capabilities to the 1,300-ton
vessels, which are intended to act as leaders for the Israeli's navy's smaller
patrol craft.
"We are going to maximize the existing design," he said. "The want to use
as much of the existing Saar V design as possible, with some additional
capabilities. So that in a couple of years they can move forward with some
additional Saar Vs."
Israel had originally planned to buy eight of the corvettes.
Meanwhile, there is little in the way of other specific international
opportunities that Northrop Grumman is looking for with its corvettes or smaller
patrol ships.
"Hopefully, there may be some customers out there that would like to
utilize the ships," Schenk said. "There's nobody specific that we have targeted
today. We know in the past there have been many customers who have looked at the
Saar V and found it to be a very, very capable ship, for a ship of only
nominally 1,300 tons."
In 2000, then-Litton lost an order to France's DCN for the design and
construction of six 3,000-ton corvettes to Singapore. Other previous U.S.
builders of small combat ships for foreign navies, like the former-Tacoma
Boatbuilders of Tacoma, Wash., and Peterson Builders, formerly of Sturgeon Bay,
Wis., have either gone bankrupt or left the business after not being able to
find enough orders. Northrop Grumman, meanwhile, takes most of its business from
the U.S. Navy.
"We're evaluating a number of opportunities and to say that there's
anything specific currently, there really isn't that we're active in," Schenk
said. "It's more of a monitoring if you will."
January 18, 2002
SECTION: Vol. 213, No. 12
Northrop Grumman Looking To Upgrade Israel's Saar V Corvettes
By Neil Baumgardner
Northrop Grumman [NOC], coming off its $5 billion acquisition last year
of Litton, is looking forward to a possible upgrade of Israel's Eilat-class
(Saar V) corvettes that were made at the company's Ingalls Shipyard in
Pascagoula, Miss., as well as the production of further vessels for Israel,
according to a company official.
"We are moving out with the Israelis right now on the Saar V Plus,"
Richard Schenk, the vice president for business development with Northrop
Grumman Ship Systems, yesterday told Defense Daily during the Surface Navy
Association's annual symposium in Arlington, Va. "We've finished our
negotiations and are very close to having something completely in place to move
forward on conducting a feasibility study to look at upgrading existing Saar V
design to meet some new missions."
Ingalls built three Saar V corvettes for the Israeli navy in the early
1990s. One of few ships built entirely for foreign military sale by a U.S.
shipyard, the vessels are equipped with Boeing [BA] Harpoon anti-ship missiles,
the Israeli Barak vertical launch system and Raytheon's [RTN] Phalanx close-in
weapon system. According to Schenk, Northrop Grumman is looking at the
possibility of adding greater command and control capabilities to the 1,300-ton
vessels, which are intended to act as leaders for the Israeli's navy's smaller
patrol craft.
"We are going to maximize the existing design," he said. "The want to use
as much of the existing Saar V design as possible, with some additional
capabilities. So that in a couple of years they can move forward with some
additional Saar Vs."
Israel had originally planned to buy eight of the corvettes.
Meanwhile, there is little in the way of other specific international
opportunities that Northrop Grumman is looking for with its corvettes or smaller
patrol ships.
"Hopefully, there may be some customers out there that would like to
utilize the ships," Schenk said. "There's nobody specific that we have targeted
today. We know in the past there have been many customers who have looked at the
Saar V and found it to be a very, very capable ship, for a ship of only
nominally 1,300 tons."
In 2000, then-Litton lost an order to France's DCN for the design and
construction of six 3,000-ton corvettes to Singapore. Other previous U.S.
builders of small combat ships for foreign navies, like the former-Tacoma
Boatbuilders of Tacoma, Wash., and Peterson Builders, formerly of Sturgeon Bay,
Wis., have either gone bankrupt or left the business after not being able to
find enough orders. Northrop Grumman, meanwhile, takes most of its business from
the U.S. Navy.
"We're evaluating a number of opportunities and to say that there's
anything specific currently, there really isn't that we're active in," Schenk
said. "It's more of a monitoring if you will."