THE "BUFFER ZONES" MYTH

Authors: Uri Kaplan, Kirill

Construction of the separator wall near Qalqilya

A few days ago, Israel has begun the construction of "buffer zones" between Israel proper and the Palestinian territories, approximately along the 1967 border line - "the green line". Those zones are supposed to protect Israeli citizens from Palestinian infiltrators' attacks, including suicide bombers. According to recent information, the width of those "buffer zones" will be 4 km along the so-called "green line" (wherever it is possible) and 10-15 km in the Jordan valley.

In the following article we will try to explain what are those buffer zones and how effective they can be.

The first thought that comes to mind, when speaking of "buffer zones" and "demarcation lines", is a fence. And indeed, the fence is one of the most important elements of the buffer zone, but not the only one.

The main components of the "buffer zone":

1. The fence.

Normally, the fence is made from metal, consisting of complex system of tension sensors. The sensors react to any significant disturbance of the fence, either an attempt to penetrate it or to break the integrity of the system itself. When such an attempt is detected, a signal is passed to the observation station automatically. Fences can be built in several rows and include, besides the sensors, electric current running through the fence as well as several rows of barbed wire.

However, in several areas of the future "buffer zones", apperently as a cost cutting measure, a concrete wall is being constructed instead of the usual "gader maarehet" - "system fence" as described above. This has some advantages - obviously, the cost is lower, and it's much harder to penetrate a wall made out of concrete blocks. However, there is one serious drawback - unlike with the "system fence", any successful penetration of the wall will not be immediately detected by the sensors.

2. Observation systems

Miscellaneous means of surveillance of the area close to the fence. First of all, there are night and day video cameras located on pylons above the fence itself. The cameras broadcast to observation station, where operators, who observe the barrier and the nearby area, are located. Besides the video cameras, installation of other sensors is also possible, including infrared cameras, even radars. The key factor is cost, which limits placement of the more sophisticated sensors.

To compensate for the lack of money, small aerostats and pilotless drone aircraft are used by IDF. They enable observation of much larger areas than cameras , which are tied to a particular spot. Drone aircraft were widely used by the IDF in Lebanon since the end of the 70s, and Israeli companies are among world leaders in their development. On the other hand helium-filled blimps, used by the army and the police, are made in United States. Their diameter is 7 meters, and their cost is 80 thousand dollars. They have been used extensively as well, along the border with Lebanon and in Jerusalem.

An IDF surveillance blimp with a video camera floats above the minaret of the Omar Mosque on Bethlehem's Manger Square, during the seige of the Church of the Nativity.

3. The "Dead Zone"

An area near the fence is made into a "dead zone", which is cleard of any plants, buildings or even rocks which can serve as a cover for infiltrators. Often some part of this area are mined with anti-infantry mines and noisemakers, including wire-tripped mines. and control over natural features and buildings that are located nearby. The width of this area must be from 200 meters to 2 kilometers but considering the layout of the West Bank, in some regions (such as Qalqylia, Tul-Karem and others) it will have to be significantly reduced. In case of Jerusalem it would have to be eliminated altogether.

4. An "intrusion detection" strip

This is an integral part of any buffer zone. Specially trained pathfinders - usually composed of Bedouins or soldiers of Ethiopian origin - form a patrol team, which inspect the previously ploughed up area for tracks or any other evidence of infiltration.

5. Patrols

Soldiers who patrol along the dividing area and set ambushes, before and behind the fence. Tanks and "Nagmashot" APCs are used for detecting trespassers, because they are equipped with long-range observation equipment (including night-sights). Likewise, their weapons suite enables them to destroy the enemies from a distance.

A conservative requirement is for a battalion of soldiers with support of armor (at least one armored platoon, often two), for a piece of the buffer zone of 20-25 kilometers length. The operators who man the observation systems and maintenance personnel come separately, and wouldn't count as part of this total.

 

So, the "buffer zone" is not just a fence, but a complicated system of barriers, observation posts and patrols. This is the main problem of "buffer zones" - there is a need for huge investments and significant forces of army and police to make them effective.

For fully functional "buffer zone" between Israel and the West Bank of more than 200 kilometers of length there will be a need for hundreds of millions of dollars, intensive construction effort which will last at least a year (more probably two or more); the amount of army forces and necessary personnel will be equivalent to one and a half IDF division. This is a big number for a force that fields roughly 4 divisions of active duty troops.

 

As a result of all those efforts, will the desired aim - security of all citizens of Israel - be achieved?

Definitely no. First, the security of Israelis who live on the "territories" will most probably decrease, because the troops that now guard the settlements and the roads of the West Bank will probably be detached to patrol the buffer zones.
Second, during the current Intifada, Palestinians have prepared and imported many weapons that are able to attack Israeli cities beyond the dividing line. Those means consist of mortars, up to and including 120mm, unguided rockets such as "Katyushas" of 105mm and 122mm (such as those that were found by Israel on board of "Santorini" and "Karin-A" ships), and their own homegrown "el-Aksa/Kassam-1/2" missiles.

"Kassam-2" is a 120mm unguided rocket, with 4 to 6 kg of explosive payload and 6-8 kilometers range, with the range being inversely proportional the weight of the. It is stabilized in flight by fins welded to the casing. The engine is ignited by an electric fuse, which can be triggered by a timing mechanism. The missile is launched from rails mounted on a bipod. The precision of such missile is not great, but is enough to hit a population center.

The use of a timer is an ingenious invention, which prevents effective counter-battery fire by IDF artillery. "Kassam" missiles are manufactured at home conditions, in home workshops. During the military action in Balata refugees-camp, Israeli troops discovered a workshop for the "Kassam" manufacturing, with 7 missiles in various stages of construction, including one that was already prepared for launch. Shortly before the raid, a Palestinian driving a truck with another 8 missiles and 2 launchers was caught in the West Bank.

Launch of "Kassam-2" rocket, from a video released by the Hamas.

At night between 3-rd and 4-th of March Palestinians launched 5 missiles to Israel from Tul-Karem. That time the missiles fell on an open area, causing no injuries. However on the evening of 5-th of March a missile fell for the first time in the neighborhood of town of Sderot, and for the first time the harm was not only material - as a result of the explosion a baby was wounded.

Aside from missile attacks on Israeli cities, Palestinian terrorists will still be able to get into Israel, using ID cards of Eastern Jerusalem inhabitants and cooperation of Israeli Arabs. Not only that, but if Palestinian workers continue to receive Israeli work-permits, they will have no problem penetrating the buffer zones.

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